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ABSTRACT 
Bill Clinton, George W. Bush, and Immigration Policy: 
How 9/11 Transformed the Debate Over Illegal Immigration 
by Robert B. Nelsen 
 
Since the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, Americans have been at war against 
some form of terrorism both at home and abroad. This includes abuses of federal 
immigration laws and policies that relate to legal and illegal immigration with Mexico. It 
is easily substantiated that thousands of Americans have died at the hands of illegal 
immigrants from Mexico through criminal activity in the United States or through illegal 
drug trafficking. This thesis considers whether the immigration policies of Presidents Bill 
Clinton and George W. Bush were at fault for not properly securing the border prior to 
these attacks. Specifically, did the Bush administration effectively secure the border 
following 9/11? Furthermore, how does the substantial growth of illegal immigrants from 
1995 to 2005 correlate to the failed policies passed during this era? This analysis shows 
that it should not have taken a catastrophic event like the terrorist attacks on 9/11 to 
realize the urgent need for stronger national security in the homeland. This work 
concludes with the argument that both administrations should have placed a greater 
priority on promoting stronger federal immigration laws and policies that would have 
resulted in better solutions to permanently secure America's southern border with 
Mexico. 
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CHAPTER 1- Introduction 
When millions of New York City residents woke on a Tuesday morning in early 
September of 2001, they were thankful to see a clear blue sky rather than storm damage 
from Hurricane Erin, which had threatened the East Coast during the previous four days. 
Author George McKenna would later describe in his book, The Puritan Origins of 
American Patriotism, that the sky on this morning "was not just blue, it was a light, 
crystalline blue, cheerful and invigorating."1 But another storm of monumental 
consequences was already on its way. It was the morning of September 11, 2001.  
 Lower Manhattan had warmed to 65 degrees by 8:46 AM when the New York 
City skies suddenly exploded into the worst terrorist attack on American soil since Pearl 
Harbor. In a series of unbelievable images, American Airlines Flight 11 was flown 
directly into the World Trade Center North Tower by Al-Qaeda terrorists, and 17 minutes 
later, United Airlines Flight 175 crashed into the WTC South Tower. Within two hours 
both 110-story towers collapsed to kill 2,606 workers, fire fighters, police and visitors.2 
Two additional hijacked flights in Pennsylvania and Washington D.C. killed hundreds 
more. These horrific terrorist attacks led to a decade in which more than 6,000 American 
soldiers were killed in Middle East wars along with several smaller terrorists attacks 
inside the United States while Congress was vigilant to pass legislation that strengthened 
previously ineffective visa and border security regulations.   
 After the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks on the Twin Towers in New York 
City, the constant fear of additional terrorist strikes caused a change in how most 																																																								
1 McKenna, George. The Puritan Origins of American Patriotism. New Haven, CT: Yale 
University Press, 2007. 
2 “Deaths in World Trade Center Terrorist Attacks --- New York City, 2001.” Centers for Disease 
Control and Prevention. Department of Health and Human Services, September 9, 2002. 
https://www.cdc.gov/mmwr/preview/mmwrhtml/mm51SPa6.htm. 
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Americans viewed immigrants and prevailing immigration laws and policies. In the 
months and years following 9/11, it was not uncommon for all immigrants to be 
stereotyped as potential terrorists regardless of their legal status. In the mid-to-late 1990s, 
the United States had naively believed that the homeland was safe from foreign terrorism 
despite an earlier 1993 truck bombing in the garage of the World Trade Center. It took a 
catastrophic event like the total destruction of the Twin Towers and two additional 9/11 
attacks that caused the death of nearly 3,000 innocent lives for all Americans to realize 
the urgent need for stronger national security. Although it was a horrific time in history,  
9/11 forced all Americans to see how dangerous the world had become and why 
enhanced border security was essential. This meant that all borders and ports of entry 
needed to be soundly secured, including those with Mexico and Canada. United States 
security officials had never anticipated terrorists like those responsible for 9/11 to enter 
the United States through the federal Visa Waiver Program. As a result, future United 
States laws and policies had to prevent terrorists from entering the United States through 
abuse of any immigration program or through any port of entry. The southern border 
between the United States and Mexico was of particular concern because of ongoing 
crime, drug trafficking, illegal immigration, and easy access for potential terrorists to 
cross somewhere along the 1,954 miles.    
 Since the terrorist attacks of 9/11, Americans have been at war against some 
form of terrorism both at home and abroad. This includes abuses of federal immigration 
laws and policies that relate to legal and illegal immigration with Mexico. Thousands of 
Americans have died at the hands of illegal immigrants from Mexico through criminal 
3 
activity in the United States or through illegal drug trafficking.3 Therefore, the first 
question that confounds many who have followed American history is: Why didn't the 
United States Congress and President Bill Clinton pass immigration laws and implement 
strong policies and/or executive orders based upon earlier homeland attacks that could 
have prevented 9/11? And why did President George W. Bush fail to take advantage of 
the window of opportunity following 9/11 to fully tighten United States immigration laws 
and permanently strengthen America's southern borders with Mexico during his eight 
years in office? Throughout the thesis, it will become evident that due to the political 
environment of the time, Clinton and Bush were more focused on gaining political 
support than introducing adequate policies.  This thesis examines this period in American 
history -- the presidencies of Clinton and Bush --  and concludes with arguments on why 
it should have been a greater priority to promote stronger federal immigration laws and 
policies that would have resulted in better solutions to permanently secure America's 
southern border with Mexico.  
 Before analyzing the Clinton (1993-2001) and Bush (2001-2009) administration 
policies regarding immigration, it is necessary to outline a basic explanation of 
immigration laws in the United States during the 20th century that eventually led to 
weakened immigration policies prior to the 9/11 terrorists attacks. Since immigration 
from Mexico was minimal during the early to mid-1900s, it is more helpful to look at 
immigration that took place from other countries during this period. Following this brief 
historical analysis, it is then important to focus on immigration laws and policies along 
																																																								
3 Immigration and Customs Enforcement. Fiscal Year 2017 ICE Enforcement and Removal 
Operations Report, Fiscal Year 2017 ICE Enforcement and Removal Operations Report § (n.d.). 
https://www.ice.gov/sites/default/files/documents/Report/2017/iceEndOfYearFY2017.pdf. 
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the southern border between Mexico and the United States, starting with the Immigration 
and Naturalization Act of 1965, but primarily examining the years 1997 through 2009. 
 
The American Dream: Immigrants in the Early 1900s 
It was ironic that James Truslow Adams wrote "life should be better and richer and fuller 
for everyone, with opportunity for each according to ability or achievement” when he 
popularized the American Dream phrase in 1931. After all, the worldwide Great 
Depression was in its second year, and it certainly eroded any appreciation for the ethos 
of the American Dream as a pathway for hard workers to prosper. And this was also true 
for many new immigrants to the United States during the early 1900s in their struggles to 
overcome severe difficulties caused by massive urbanization and industrialism. Although 
business and industry thrived during the early 20th century, except during the Depression, 
the promises of the American Dream were often a double-edged sword that had enticed 
millions of immigrants to America but became a nightmare when poor living conditions, 
corruption, low wages, and unemployment led them to become a new class of urban poor. 
Instead of an America that fostered acceptance and opportunity, immigrants and 
rural migrants found cities that manifested prejudice and manipulation.  Instead of an 
America where hard work led to prosperity and success, they found cities where business 
and political corruption became the pay off. In 1900, only about one-third of people lived 
in a city with more than 2,500 people.4 However, by 1920, over half of the American 
population lived in cities.5 This rapid rise in the urban population can largely be 																																																								
4 United States Census Bureau. Population Distribution , Population Distribution, (2003). 
https://www.census.gov/population/www/cen2000/censusatlas/pdf/2_Population-
Distribution.pdf. 
5 Id. 
5 
attributed to immigrants and rural families and their pursuit of the American Dream. 
Between 1880 and 1910, about 11 million Americans moved from rural areas to the 
cities.6 As the population in cities rapidly grew, so did the problems associated with out-
of-control urban development. Most cities were unable to deal with the rapid population 
growth, including the building of adequate sewers and housing along with police stations, 
fire departments, and schools. It was low wages that forced most working families to live 
in crime-ridden neighborhoods and overcrowded tenement housing. 
Immigrants during this decade and in the several decades to follow traveled to 
America to pursue their dream of prosperity. However, as hundreds of thousands of 
immigrants surged to America, living conditions worsened and drove many immigrants 
back to their homelands. For every 100 immigrants from Europe, 44 went back because 
they realized that going from “rags to riches” was not possible during the 
industrialization period. It was during this period that the American Dream seemed the 
most hollow.7 
During the progressive era in the early years of the 1900s, there were many pieces 
of literature that personified the living conditions for many immigrants who migrated to 
the United States. One of those was the 1906 novel, The Jungle, by Upton Sinclair, which 
elaborates on how the promise of the ideals of an American Dream was nothing more 
than a scam from the corrupt wealthy. In Sinclair’s novel, the author narrates how he 
believes capitalism during this time attacked the values of an American Dream through 
greed and corruption. The Jungle was just one of many depictions about the poor social 
and living conditions for immigrants. Novels like Lincoln Steffens’ The Shame of the 																																																								
6 Id. 
7 Martin, Susan. A Nation of Immigrants. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2010. 
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Cities and Ida Tarbell’s History of the Standard Oil Company both told similar tales of 
how immigrants were funneled into poor living conditions. Even in the 1936 silent film, 
Modern Times, the shallow promise of the American Dream is further personified by 
factory working conditions during the Great Depression. The opening scenes of the 
movie show how workers are forced to work at the mace of the machines, which are sped 
up on numerous occasions because of the greed by the factory owner to produce more 
goods. This idea of the American Dream has dehumanized people to work in factories 
and become little more than cogs in a machine. 
 
The Greedy 20’s to World War II 
The “Roaring 20s” ought to be known as the “Greedy 20s” as the wealthy class sought to 
get rich by any means possible. By 1921, more farmers were moving to the cities since 
prices for corn corps had dropped 77 percent in the preceding two years.8 The economy 
in the cities was beginning to boom as the shift from producing capital goods to 
consumer goods generated thousands of new jobs. Steel production was in its heyday as it 
went on to supply the material for the hundreds of thousands of Model-T automobiles. 
Radios also saw booming increases in sales with 843 million sold alone in 1929.9 The 
American Dream seemed like the real deal until Wall Street corruption brought about the 
stock market crash in late 1929. While some working conditions in the cities had 
improved during the 1920s, Prohibition had also created chaos for the immigrant 
working-class in their pursuit of upward social mobility. 																																																								
8 United States. Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis. “Farm Prices of Corn and Fruit”, (1924). 
9 “Radio: A Consumer Product and a Producer of Consumption.” Radio: A Consumer Product 
and a Producer of Consumption. Library of Congress, 1995. 
http://lcweb2.loc.gov:8081/ammem/amrlhtml/inradio.html. 
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In the novel, Dry Manhattan, by Michael Lerner, the author accurately describes 
the years leading up to Prohibition in addition to illustrating the problems of enforcing 
the ban on alcohol sales. Lerner explained how several notable hotels in New York had to 
close in Prohibition's first year of 1920, which affected the economy but more 
importantly stripped valuable jobs from the immigrant working-class. Smaller businesses 
were also affected because they were unable to recoup the lost alcohol sales. This made it 
difficult for the immigrant working-class because of the lost jobs and declining wages. 
Another example of greed in the novel was when Prohibition zealot William Anderson 
disguised his intolerance for the working class and foreigners with his “American” 
morals. He pitted the ethnic public against white Americans. Anderson portrayed foreign 
immigrants as threatening to everything genuinely American. Because of the additional 
social divide created by Prohibition, living conditions were especially difficult for hard-
working immigrants trying to support their families.10  
When Prohibition was enacted, bars were shutdown. Subsequently, immigrant 
workers did not have a place to relax and drink after a long day of work. Prohibition also 
created a criminal environment to the already frenzied life style for the working class. 
The popular 1931 mobster movie, The Public Enemy, shows how unsavory aspirations 
for the American Dream can also lead to criminal behavior. The two main characters, 
Tom and Matt, start their life of crime at an early age and later become Prohibition 
bootleggers in the Chicago underworld. Ultimately, they are killed to demonstrate the 
consequences of trying to pursue personal gain through crime.11 
																																																								
10 Lerner, Michael A. Dry Manhattan: Prohibition in New York City. Cambridge, MA: Harvard 
University Press, 2008. 
11 The Public Enemy . United States: Warner Brothers, 1931. 
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With the end of Prohibition in 1933, the United States was in the grips of the 
Great Depression. Because there were few good paying jobs, it also brought about an 
ugly period in history that further excluded immigrants from finding employment. This 
only deepened the segregation and discrimination that was left over from slavery and the 
Civil War. What has been called the “Discriminatory Century” became more of a reality. 
Any pursuit to achieve the American Dream was faced with discrimination. Hard-
working immigrants were unable to earn a fair wage, regardless of how hard they 
worked. Immigrants were not hired for high-paying jobs. In order to divide and segregate 
the population more, the Grandfather Clause was implemented for voting in the southern 
states. It stated that if your grandfather had voted in the past then you were eligible to 
vote, which basically eliminated all immigrants from voting.12  There was also a question 
section before voting to “qualify” individuals in their right to vote. However, the 
difficulty of questions was much harder for immigrants. It was said that this solved the 
“immigrant problem” and successfully took them out of politics. It was this kind of 
discrimination that prevented many ethnic groups from having the freedom to achieve 
prosperity in the American Dream.     
As the Great Depression lingered, there were many speed bumps for families 
trying to pursue the American Dream. With the start of World War II in 1939 in Europe, 
more industry jobs were created to supply U.S. Allies with weapons. Following the attack 
on Pearl Harbor in late 1941, the United States declared war on Japan, Germany, and 
Italy. This fueled the economy for several years and led to a tremendous need for more 
workers to support the war effort. But the downside of World War II was that nearly 																																																								
12 “Grandfather Clause.” Legal Information Institute. Cornell Law School, June 22, 2015. 
https://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/grandfather_clause. 
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400,000 men were killed and over 600,000 were wounded.13 This created difficult 
problems for families since the main wage earner was either killed or wounded.  
Following the end of the Korean conflict in 1953, the Cold War between the Soviet 
Union and the United States led to a 30-year period that stymied immigrants’ pursuit of 
the American Dream. 
 
The Immigration and Naturalization Act of 1965 
Until the 1960s, the Immigration Act of 1924 placed an immigration limit through the 
national origins quota. The quota provided immigration visas to each nationality by 
providing only two percent of the total number of each nationality in the United States 
based on the 1890 national census.14 As the civil rights movement was flourishing in the 
early 1960s, there was a call to reform immigration policy. President John F. Kennedy 
began the discussion in June of 1963, calling the quota “intolerable.”15 But following his 
assassination in November 1963, the discussion moved to Congress, which passed the 
Immigration and Naturalization Act of 1965 that eliminated the quota. President Lyndon 
B. Johnson would later falsely claim that the act “is not a revolutionary bill. It does not 
affect the lives of millions….It will not reshape the structure of our daily lives or add 
importantly to either our wealth or our power.”16 This was in response to the backlash 
from those who saw the possibility of immigration getting out of hand.  
																																																								
13 U.S. Department of Commerce. “World War II: 70 Years On.” World War II: 70 Years On. 
14 H.R. 2580, 89th Cong. (Jun 30th, 1968) (enacted). 
15 Ludden, Jennifer. “1965 Immigration Law Changed Face of America.” NPR. NPR, May 9, 
2006. https://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=5391395. 
16 Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Lyndon B. Johnson, 1965. Volume II, 
entry 546, pp. 1037-1040. Washington, D. C.: Government Printing Office, 1966. 
10 
 The legislation that was passed in 1965 marked a change to immigration policy 
and had a drastic impact for years to come. Instead of the quota, it allowed the 
government to place preferences on the immigrants who received legal status; for 
example, preference was given to anyone who had relatives in the United States. The goal 
of the bill, along with most pieces of immigration legislation, was aimed at the 
unification of families. In the five years following the bill’s passage, immigration from 
Asian countries more than quadrupled. Due to other Cold War-era conflicts during the 
1960s and 1970s, immigration from many communist regimes like Cuba, Eastern 
European countries, and elsewhere drastically increased. From 1965 to 1995, following 
the Immigration and Naturalization Act of 1965, the number of immigrants tripled from 
the preceding 30 years.17 During this same period, the highest number of immigrants that 
came to the United States were from Mexico, with a total of 4.3 million.18 
 Following the Immigration and Naturalization Act of 1965, there was a huge 
influx of illegal Mexican immigrants flooding the borders. Although for many, the INA 
of 1965 seemed like the morally right thing to do, it consequently allowed and resulted in 
thousands of undocumented and dangerous criminal immigrants to live in the United 
States. Although it is true that many were women and children searching for a more 
prosperous life, it still opened the door for criminals and expanded drug traffic. It took 
another 20 years and more than two million undocumented immigrants before the 
Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986 was passed. This new act was “passed in 
order to control and deter illegal immigration to the United States.” Its major provisions 
granted legal status to undocumented immigrants who had continuously lived in the 																																																								
17 "Illegal Alien Resident Population." Department of Homeland Security. 
https://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/statistics/illegal.pdf. 
18 Id. 
11 
United States since 1982, legalized certain agricultural workers, enacted sanctions for 
employers who knowingly hired undocumented workers, and increased enforcement at 
U.S. borders.19 Following the implementation of the IRCA, the irony is that the greatest 
number of apprehensions by the border patrol for illegal crossing happened in 1986.20 
 
Conclusion 
Contrary to popular belief among most Americans, there had been strides taken towards 
developing stricter immigration laws and policies prior to Bill Clinton’s presidency. 
However, it can be argued that these immigration measures were ineffective in stopping 
the mass flow of illegal immigrants from Mexico. Even though most Americans pushed 
for stronger immigration policies, President George H. W. Bush signed into law the 
Immigration Act of 1990 (IMMACT) that actually increased legal admissions. 
Californians reacted to the burdens of illegal immigration in their state by passing 
Proposition 187.21 This proposition was promoted by then governor Pete Wilson in a 
bitter political clash that was a precursor to today's political climate on the issue of 
immigration. Prop 187 created a state-run screening system that prevented illegal 
immigrants from using non-emergency health care, public education, and other services 
in California.22 However, one month after Proposition 187 passed, a judicial order ruled it 
to be unconstitutional and prevented the implementation of the newly voter-passed 
																																																								
19 H.R. 3810, 99th Congress. (October 9th, 1986) (enacted). 
20 Office of Policy and Planning, and Department of Homeland Security. Estimates of the 
Unauthorized Immigrant Population Residing in the United States. 
https://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/statistics/publications/Ill_Report_1211.pdf. 
21 Prop 187. 1994. (Passed). 
22 Id. 
12 
proposition, declaring that voters could not pass a law regarding federal jurisdiction of 
immigration.23 
 Operation Gate Keeper, which became law in 1994, was major immigration 
legislation passed early in Clinton’s first term and would be one of the strictest 
immigration policies passed during the Clinton presidency. However, the law was one 
step in the right direction towards a stronger national security policy, but was two steps 
back in the implementation of the law. The goal of Operation Gatekeeper was to severely 
limit illegal immigrants from entering the United States; however, the number of illegal 
immigrants instead rose from 5.7 million in 1995 to 8.6 million in 2000.24 This increase 
of illegal immigrants illustrates the failed implementation and lack of resolve to 
accomplish the goals of Operation Gate Keeper. If the operation did not lower illegal 
immigration, did Clinton and his administration view it as a failure?  The upcoming 
presidential election of 1996 encouraged Clinton to try and gain the support of California 
voters, and those states bordering Mexico. This means that motives behind Operation 
Gatekeeper were partially politically driven, rather than because of the consequences of 
illegal immigration.  
 While there has been a lot of research on Mexican immigration pre- and post-
9/11, which will be examined in Chapter 2, and most of the immigration research looks at 
the passage of immigrants into the United States and the effects of the legislation that was 
passed. There has been little research that analyzes the failure of both Clinton and Bush 
to properly secure the Mexican-American border. It can be argued that failed laws and 																																																								
23 McDonnell, Patrick J. “Prop. 187 Found Unconstitutional by Federal Judge.” Los Angeles 
Times, November 15, 1997. 
24 U.S. Immigration and Naturalization Service. Office of Policy and Planning. Estimates of the 
Unauthorized Immigrant Population Residing in the United States. Accessed February 20, 2019. 
https://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/statistics/publications/Ill_Report_1211.pdf. 
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policies that affected Mexico extended to other lax immigration laws like the Visa 
Waiver Program and how their failures attributed to the eventual terrorists attacks on 
9/11. 
Chapter 3 begins by looking at the start of Clinton’s second term in office, 
including the Visa Waiver Program, which is the immigration program that allowed the 
9/11 terrorists to legally enter the United States. It is important to note that legislation 
passed by Congress and implemented during Clinton’s first term will be of importance, 
especially Operation Gate Keeper, and how the policies affected both legal and illegal 
immigration during his second term. Rhetoric during the implementation of Operation 
Gatekeeper will be analyzed since it is important to the immigration debate prior to 2001. 
The political environment is a key factor that will be looked at, specifically during the 
1996 reelection of President Clinton. This chapter will look at how this election played an 
important role in the decisions made by the Clinton administration. This chapter 
concludes with an analysis of the 2000 presidential campaign of George W. Bush, and 
how he appealed to Mexican-American voters, as well as immigration reform policies 
during the first nine months of 2001, prior to September 11th.  
Chapter 4 will start by examining the three major pieces of legislation that were 
passed by Congress and signed by President Bush following the 9/11 terrorist attacks and 
how they drastically impacted immigration policies related to Mexico: the Anti-Terrorism 
Act of 2001, the Homeland Security Act of 2002, and the Patriot Act. This chapter  
concludes by analyzing how 9/11 transformed the Mexican-American border and how 
these three pieces of legislation further resulted in policies that affected legal and illegal 
immigration. 
14 
The concluding chapter provides research that argues it should not have taken a 
catastrophic event like the terrorist attacks in New York City and two additional 9/11 
attacks on American soil that caused the death of more than 3,000 innocent lives to 
realize the urgent need for stronger national security in the homeland. Weak immigration 
laws and implementation policies since the early 1990s and throughout Bush's eight years 
in office did not discourage millions of illegal immigrants from Mexico and Central 
America. Therefore, the United States federal government and several southern border 
states have taken on the social, economic, and criminal burden of illegal immigration.  
This chapter will also reason that due to the political environment of the time, 
Clinton and Bush were influenced to be tough on illegal immigration. For Clinton, Prop. 
187 was critical in his stance on illegal immigration as he was seeking reelection in 1996. 
For Bush, the domestic terror on 9/11 significantly influenced his strong national security 
stance. This chapter will also argue that illegal immigration is a national security issue. 
Finally, the conclusion seeks to answer the following questions: Why didn't the 
United States Congress and President Clinton pass laws and implement strong policies 
and/or executive orders dealing with the politically divisive problem of illegal 
immigration? And, how did President Bush fail to take advantage of the 9/11 window of 
opportunity to fully strengthen United States immigration laws that would have 
permanently strengthened America's southern border with Mexico? 
 
  
15 
CHAPTER 2 
“Great harm has been done to us. We have suffered great loss. And in our grief and 
anger we have found our mission and our moment. Freedom and fear are at war. The 
advance of human freedom — the great achievement of our time, and the great hope of 
every time — now depends on us. Our nation — this generation — will lift a dark threat 
of violence from our people and our future. We will rally the world to this cause by our 
efforts, by our courage. We will not tire, we will not falter, and we will not fail.”  
– George W. Bush, Address to the Joint Session of the 107th Congress 
 
When President George W. Bush declared a “War on Terror” on September 20, 
2001 before the 107th Session of Congress, political journalists and news media outlets 
immediately turned their attention to the politics of war.  Journalists and authors began 
transcribing articles and novels concerning how the 9/11 terrorist attacks had transformed 
the immigration debate in America. As the country was mourning the nearly 3,000 killed, 
the government was enacting measures to strengthen border security to ensure that future 
terrorists could not cross United States borders. The majority of what was written 
explained the subsequent national and worldwide effect of the terrorist attacks, and how it 
was expected that new legislation would greatly improve national security . There also 
was a lot written about the failed national security policies that allowed the 9/11 attacks 
to happen, as well as a continuing commentary on how the United States had initiated 
stricter national security policies after 9/11. However, there has been little research that 
examined the increasing illegal immigration numbers from Mexico, which would have 
concluded that immigration policies enacted after 9/11 did little to stop illegal migration 
and were just as much a failure as those previously enacted. With all that was written, 
there is also scant analysis regarding why President Clinton and President Bush failed to 
tighten illegal immigrant crossings at the U.S.-Mexican border before or even after the 
September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks.  This chapter analyzes the current research on 
16 
Mexican immigration and will also look at writings concerning why the United States has 
the territorial jurisdiction and obligation to control its borders.  
 
The Border Patrol in the 1990s 
The United States Border Patrol, which was apart of the Immigration and Naturalization 
Service (INS) prior to 9/11, and then part of the U.S. Customs and Border Protection 
(CBP) in the United States Department of Homeland Security (DHS) following 9/11, is 
the federal law enforcement agency whose responsibility is to detect and prevent illegal 
aliens, terrorists and terrorist weapons from entering the United States, and prevent illegal 
trafficking of people and contraband.  The Border Patrol is also in charge of immigration 
along the Mexico-United States border. Prior to the 9/11 terrorist attacks, the U.S. Border 
Patrol was solely focused on illegal immigration and drug control rather than having to 
stop terrorists.  
In Border Games: Policing the U.S.-Mexico Divide, Peter Andreas agrees that 
after 9/11, “these already overstretched agencies were now expected to reinvent 
themselves to play a frontline role against terrorism.”25 Prior to the attacks, Border Patrol 
was strictly focused on finding drugs being smuggled across the border, not necessarily 
looking for possible terrorists.  
Chapter 3 will evaluate how effectively the southern border was patrolled at the 
start and during President Clinton’s second term. Even though there was an increased 
focus on drug smuggling, most Americans had a widespread fear of illegal immigrants 
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pouring into the United States. Professor Andreas explains how many politicians, 
specifically then-Governor of California Pete Wilson, played upon these sentiments: 
 
“In a brilliant political move, Governor Pete Wilson of California revived his 
floundering 1994 electoral campaign by blaming the state’s woes on the federal 
government’s failure to control the border. His most effective tool for 
communication of this message was a television advertisement based on video 
footage of illegal immigrants dashing across the border from Mexico into the 
southbound traffic at the San Ysidro port of entry. Against the background of this 
chaotic scene the narrator’s voice said: ‘They keep coming. Two million illegal 
immigrants in California. The federal government won’t stop them at the border, 
yet requires us to pay billions to take care of them. Governor Wilson sent the 
National Guard to help the Border Patrol. But that’s not all… I am suing to force 
the federal government to control the border and I’m working to deny state 
services to illegal immigrants. Enough is Enough.”26  
 
 During the 1990s, illegal immigration was stereotyped by the footage of illegals 
swarming the border like locusts, almost animalistic and to be feared. Even though the 
nation was beginning to reach economic prosperity, Clinton defended his border 
immigration reform policies, “We can’t afford to lose control of our own borders at a 
time when we are not adequately providing for the jobs, health care, and the education of 
our own people.”27 While some political historians believe Clinton was strong -- almost 
too strong in some areas -- on immigration after his reelection and to the end of his 
presidency, immigration was a low priority issue for Clinton at the beginning of his first 
term before it eventually became one of his highest priorities. In 1993, Clinton held a 
news conference where he proclaimed that there must be a strong message against illegal 
immigration and that the United States must make it tougher for them to enter. This set 
the tone for his future immigration policies and recommendations to Congress for 
stronger immigration reforms. During Clinton’s presidency, the Immigration and 																																																								
26 Andreas, supra note 25 
27 ABC News, This Week with David Brinkley, 20 June 1993 
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Naturalization Service’s (INS) budget nearly tripled from $1.5 billion to $4.2 billion, as 
more than $3 billion was spent on border security between 1994 and 1998.28  
Professor Andreas makes solid points when he cites that the number of Border 
Patrol agents more than doubled, the budget nearly tripled, the number of arrests more 
than doubled, and new fencing went up along the border. However, even with all of these 
new immigration policies during Clinton’s term, the number of illegal immigrants in the 
United States still rose from 5.7 million in 1995 to 8.6 million in 2000.29  
While Andreas argues that it became more difficult for immigrants, he does not 
fully analyze why they were still able to cross the border illegally at record numbers. He 
does suggest that because of the stronger laws, the “smuggling of migrants across the 
U.S.-Mexico border has become a more organized business, which has served to justify 
still tougher laws and tougher enforcement.”30 But still Andreas does not come to any 
concrete conclusions why Clinton’s new but flawed regulations and enforcement policies 
did not better prevent illegal immigration.  
Like Andreas’s work, most authors’ pre-September 11 have argued that there was 
a concentrated focus on illegal immigration. Andreas even points out that although there 
was a rise in illegal immigration, there was still an increase in security on the border. 
Andreas does briefly discuss how 9/11 terrorist attacks affected the U.S.- Mexico border, 
even though he argues that the more “important” border control failure was the Visa 
Waiver program and those “issued to the hijackers by the consulate offices overseas.”31 
Like most authors who look at policies before and after 9/11, their claims that border 																																																								
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security was tightened have become their strongest argument. However, if Clinton and 
Bush had supposedly strong immigration policies, why weren’t they strong enough to 
prevent the increases in illegal immigrants from coming into the United States? Andreas 
argues that immigration policies did strengthen after 9/11, and that the numbers of illegal 
immigration and crimes committed by these immigrants had previously increased over 
the years. If the policies were supposed to strengthen, then there must be another answer 
to the increases in illegal immigration.  
Following the attacks, the borders were heavily tightened. Andreas gives the 
example that prior to 9/11 in Laredo, Texas, to enter the border took 5-10 minutes. 
Immediately following the attacks, it increased up to five hours. During this time, trade 
with Mexico was a major role in Mexican economics. Prior to these terrorist attacks, 
trade with Mexico had trumped security. However, following the attacks, security 
trumped trade. This is evident in the funding of the border patrol and the hiring of border 
patrol agents. By 2009, the border patrol was more than double the size than it was in 
2001.32 
Andreas’s point was that there was a focus during Clinton’s term on immigration 
and strengthening the border. But following 9/11, there was a major crackdown on the 
border that slowed down the process of coming into the United States. There is a 
disconnect between these two times, because Clinton’s legislation is viewed as being “too 
strict” by most authors, including Andreas, yet still allowed millions of illegal immigrants 
to enter. And now with regards to following 9/11, the borders became even more strict, 
however, there is a lack of research to argue it was not effectively done because illegal 																																																								
32 United States. Department of Homeland Security. Customs and Border Protection. U.S. Border 
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immigrants were still able to enter the United States at record highs, even following the 
9/11 terrorist attacks. 
 
Rhetoric of Immigrants and the Militarization of the Border 
Much of the research following 9/11 has been focused on the rhetoric of 
immigrants, and how both legal and illegal immigrants have become connected to 
terrorism. Chapter 4 will argue that it is reasonable for illegal immigrants who are 
illegally entering the United States to be considered criminals because, in the first place, 
they are knowingly breaking U.S. law when they cross the border. For the families who 
want to migrate into the United States legally, there has been a legal process for them to 
enter legally. There has been a lot of research that looks at how immigrants are viewed 
post-9/11, and how this allowed for the militarization of the border. The rhetoric toward 
immigrants has been caused by fear of another terrorist attack, which reflects the failed 
immigration policies immediately following 9/11. 
The language and rhetoric towards immigrants also changed following the 9/11 
attacks, mostly due to the fear of terrorism. The most obvious change was by President 
Bush immediately following September 11. Even though the terrorists did not come from 
Mexico, Bush encouraged citizens to “resist suspicion or distrust of the foreign 
newcomer based purely on his or her foreignness.”33 When Bush correlated fear with 
immigrants, this allowed the United States to militarize the border. Because fear is 
correlated with immigration, crime control becomes a central theme. In The Borders of 
Punishment: Migration, Citizenship, and Social Exclusion, the authors write, “In the 																																																								
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United States, Cisneros argues that visual images of immigrants appear as ‘pollutants’ in 
news media, collecting like piles of dangerous ‘toxic waste’ rolling towards the 
frightened US citizen.”34 With a nationalist approach, a closed border is the solution to 
fear. With a fear of terrorists, the only solution is stronger prevention measures, like 
strengthening the borders while increasing the funds towards boarder security. Prior to 
9/11, immigrants were not all feared as potential terrorists. Because of the recent terrorist 
attacks, there was a shift to the political and social immigrant paradigm. This is similar to 
the heightened security in airports following 9/11. It is obvious that not all passengers are 
terrorists, but the heightened security is a measure to prevent terrorists from being able to 
easily board a plane. Similarly, not all immigrants entering the country are terrorists, but 
heightened security prevents those terrorists from easily entering.   
When there is a domestic terror attack, not only does fear create a change to 
policy by the federal government, but citizens feel the necessity to take matters into their 
own hands. For the United States, citizens became national watchdogs. In Roxanne Lynn 
Doty’s book The Law Into Their Own Hands: Immigration and the Politics of 
Exceptionalism, she discussed the civilian led efforts that involved armed civilians on the 
U.S.-Mexico border surveying for illegal immigrants attempting to cross into the United 
States. Due to the resources by the government mostly on the California-Mexico border, 
immigrants shifted their approach to the Arizona-Mexico border, where the Minuteman 
Project held its front. The Minuteman Project was a volunteer-led organization where 
civilians became watchdogs along the Mexico border. The terrorist attacks on 9/11 
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created this window of opportunity to strengthen the borders, as these independent 
groups, like the Minutemen Project, used the terrorist attacks as a catalyst: 
“When such societal groups perceive a threat to their security, a sense of 
emergency is generated and with it a willingness to take extraordinary 
emergency measures. The forms that “emergency measures” take can, of 
course, vary tremendously depending on the situation. Groups can take the 
law into their own hands in a variety of ways. They can offer their 
assistance to legal authorities. They can be violent or nonviolent. They can 
engage in symbolic practices in efforts to prompt the state to take action. 
Societal security highlights the fact that pronouncements of security 
concerns are not solely the purview of state actors.”35 
 Although Clinton’s immigration policies were aimed at strengthening the border, 
if they were successfully implemented, there would not be a need for citizens to take 
action into their own hands. Doty looks at why citizens believed it was in their best 
interest to stand guard on the borders and help the border agents with their jobs. The 
immigration movement was present before 9/11, however the terrorist attacks 
strengthened the link between the immigration movement and national security.36  
 One of the immigration movement organizations that Doty looks at is the 
Federation for American Immigration Reform (FAIR). FAIR’s mission is “to improve 
border security, to stop illegal immigration, and promote immigration levels consistent 
with the national interest—more traditional rates of about 300,000 per year.”37 This 																																																								
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organization was created long before 9/11, in 1979 by environmentalist John Tenton. In 
1999, during President Clinton’s second term, FAIR went after Michigan Senator 
Spencer Abraham because of his pro-immigrant stance. The organization ran an ad with a 
picture that included the senator and Osama Bin Laden, titled “Why is a U.S. Senator 
Trying to Make it Easy for Osama bin Laden to Export Terrorism to the U.S.?” Doty 
argues that it is fear that creates the need for stronger borders. She argues that the events 
on September 11th, 2001 did “breathe new life” into the anti-immigration movement. It 
was U.S. Representative Duncan Hunter of California who proclaimed, “Prior to 
September 11, 2001, illegal immigration was considered a regional issue without national 
implications. We quickly learned on that day, however, that this is a national issue, 
affecting each and every American, not just those living in border communities like San 
Diego county.”  
 When the media is highlighting anti-immigration groups and publicizing the fear 
of another terrorist attack, politicians feel the inclination to strengthen the border and 
improve national security policies. Although there was some legislation passed, the 
Mexican border was clearly never effectively secured in the years immediately following 
September 11th, illustrating failed national security policies. The reason organizations are 
creating this fear is because there was still a rise in illegal immigration immediately 
following these terrorist attacks, illustrating the need for a stronger national security 
policy. This fear has allowed the militarization of the border through the mission of 
“homeland security”.  
Militarization of the border is what the authors of The Borders of Punishment 
focused on throughout their book. “The border is policed not only by state-sanctioned 
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personnel but also by private citizens. This combination of patriotism, vigilantism, and 
racism amplifies security concerns and suppresses the humanity of those crossing the 
border.”38 Many of the writings on immigration make militarization seem evil and argue 
that the United States should not do so. But at what point does the United States 
strengthen our borders? When terrorists do enter the United States, at what point does the 
United States government have the right to protect its people by putting armed guards at 
the border? From 2001-2005, persecution on immigration law violations doubled, 
surpassing drug law violations as the most enforced federal law. The United States should 
have the power to enforce its laws, and it is not wrong to focus on border security 
following one of the biggest national terrorist attacks in the last century. 
 
The Sovereignty Debate – Territorial Jurisdiction 
The majority of the work done on immigration questions why there is an immigration 
debate, along with the reasons why countries protect its borders. Sovereignty is one 
reason why countries have the power and right to militarize at the border. Sovereignty is 
defined as the “authority of a state to govern itself.” Sovereignty is the reason there is an 
immigration debate, as it allows the United States to “self-preserve.” David Miller in 
Strangers in Our Midst questions that by asking, “suppose there were no separate states, 
but simply administrative districts accountable to a world government of some sort. 
There would then be no immigration in the sense in which we understand it.”39 But does 
this also mean that the United States could have closed borders and not let anyone in 
other than U.S. citizens? This would be a cynical view on immigration, yet still a valid 																																																								
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approach because sovereignty allows militarization of the border. Understanding this 
concept of sovereignty is important when analyzing immigration policy, because it gives 
the power to the state actor to control who enters the country. 
However, Miller argues that sovereignty is not a valid political argument. Miller 
believes that sovereignty does not give states ultimate power because it assumes that 
government power is the correct one without giving flexibility. Miller argues that the idea 
of territorial jurisdiction is a more “promising approach.”40 This type of approach or 
theory is one that will be tied in the next chapters to the policy procedures set forth by 
Presidents Clinton and Bush. Miller first lays out his theory by looking at two parts of the 
claim: first, stating that it is important to establish what jurisdiction means and then how 
this correlates with border control. Miller defines jurisdiction as the means “possessing 
and exercising the right to make and enforce laws throughout that area of land, laws that 
apply to everyone who is physically present on the territory.”41 The question Miller must 
then answer is, under what conditions can a state rightfully claim territorial jurisdiction? 
 Miller gives a three-part answer to this question. First, Miller reasons that a state 
“must maintain social order and protect the human rights of the inhabitants to a 
sufficiently high degree.”42 Although the degree may depend, the state must be actively 
trying to uphold a degree of human rights, which may include having a military to protect 
its citizens, or a strong national security policy. In the United States, this would include 
having a legal system like the one created by the U.S. Constitution.  The second condition 
that must be met is that the state must represent the inhabitants of the territory. This 
condition can be looked at from a few different angles, but the core meaning to it is that 																																																								
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the people should regard the state as having legal authority over them. This does not 
include the dictatorships that force their leadership over the people, but instead the people 
accept the state for what it is. The way that condition is met in the United States is 
through a democratically elected government where there is representation of the people. 
The final condition is that “the people whom the state represents should themselves have 
the right to occupy the territory in question.”43 This means that the state cannot forcibly 
remove the majority of the occupants and replace it with their own. It is important to note 
that these conditions are for modern politics, specifically since the 20th century, so claims 
against the United States over the European colonization are not valid. 
Now that the three conditions are laid out for territorial jurisdiction, it is 
understood that there are at least two rights that come with this jurisdiction. The first right 
is that the state has the right to control and use the resources that the land provides. The 
second is the right to control the movement of people and goods across its borders. Both 
these rights fall to the state as long as the three conditions are met. As mentioned, one of 
these conditions is to protect the human rights of its inhabitants. Miller argues that this 
also includes immigrants, which includes housing, education, and health care. However, 
Miller only uses the term immigrants, as if implying they are legal immigrants who 
entered the country legally.44 It should be argued that if an immigrant breaks the law to 
enter the country, almost like breaking the law to enter private property, then that 
immigrant forgoes these rights because they are breaking the laws from the state that has 
territorial jurisdiction. 
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Why is controlling the inflow of immigrants a crucial responsibility by the state? 
The condition regarding human rights can directly correlate with the influx of 
immigrants. For example, let’s say a country has complete open borders. The influx of 
immigrants, thus an influx of population within the country, would prevent that state 
from being able to adequately maintain the human rights of all of its people. Because a 
state must be able to fulfill this condition, the state is thus able to control the amount of 
people that enters its territory. Miller makes the point that it “is not that a self-
determining political community must close its borders, but that it must have the right to 
control its borders in order to preserve a meaningful range of policy choices without 
detriment to the human rights of those it choose to admit.”45 This is a major claim 
because this means the United States has a right to control its borders, even if that meant 
having strict closed borders. 
The main reason Miller argues the right for states to control its borders is because 
of population size. With the rise in state population, especially if the state is unable to 
hold a certain number of people, other factors become important. When a state is unable 
to support itself, there must be a limit where they can control its political and economic 
outcome. With a surplus of people, it becomes fiscally impossible to maintain the 
standard of human rights set out by the conditions of territorial jurisdiction. Miller uses 
global warming as an example, because the only way global warming would decrease is 
through the decrease use of carbon emissions.46 However, with a surplus of immigrants 
into first-world countries, the use of carbon emissions would only drastically increase, 
thus making it impossible to solve this issue. 																																																								
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The rhetoric towards immigration is important to look at because it helps create 
the legislation that is passed towards immigrants. Although Miller makes the point that a 
state has conditions to meet, which means a state is allowed to control its borders, when 
the rhetoric towards immigrants is more violent and aggressive, it is more likely that 
migrant families looking for a better way of life are denied that opportunity.47 
 
Classification of Illegal Immigrants 
This classification of immigrants is exactly what Ngai in Impossible Subjects looks at. 
This classification is an important part of immigration policy because if immigrants are 
dehumanized as “aliens,” then policies can be more consequential. Ngai looks at the 
historical origins of the term “illegal alien,” which is from 1924 to 1965.48 This term 
“alien” excludes the immigrants from society and prevents integration. Ngai argues that 
this classification is present before 9/11, which indicates that 9/11 was not a deciding 
factor in this classification. However, it is clear that 9/11 brought the topic to a national 
level, because it forced people to believe that terrorists are currently migrating into the 
United States, even though there have been many cases where the terrorists were born in 
the U.S. 
Ngai analyzes the “alien” classification of immigrants by looking at an extreme 
case of immigrant seclusion, the World War II internment of Japanese Americans. She 
argues how “alien citizenship” is “Asian Americans and Mexican Americans born in the 
United States with formal U.S. citizenship but who remained alien in the eyes of the 
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nation.”49 In the late 1950s to early 1960s, Ngai argues that the fear of communism is 
what ignited the debate on border security, as “the New York Times estimated that in 
1953, 1.5 million illegal immigrants streamed across the Mexican border, without so 
much as a How-do-you-do to an American immigration inspector.”50 Ngai continues by 
explaining that it was not until 1965 that there were negotiations over immigration reform 
bills, as she coined the strict conservative immigration policy as the “Western 
Hemisphere immigration policy.” 
When classifying illegal immigrants as “aliens,” it puts legal, integrated Mexican 
Americans in a tough spot. Because both groups of people, legal Mexican-Americans and 
illegal migrants, have a similar heritage, yet one group is viewed as criminals while the 
other is not. In Walls and Mirrors, Gutierrez analyzes the relationship between “illegal 
aliens,” and legal born Mexicans. Illegal Aliens were categorized not only as possible 
terrorist, but were also seen to be uneducated and dangerous. “Already subject to the 
stigma of being Mexican in American society, many Mexican Americans feared that the 
mass immigration of impoverished, uneducated Mexican peasants would reinforce and 
inflame the negative stereotypes Americans already held about Mexicans.”51 The terrorist 
attacks on September 11th only heightened these fears by legal Mexican-Americans. 
Following the attacks, Mexican immigrants were viewed as “aliens” and tied to terrorism. 
The perception of illegal Mexican immigrants is similar to how the Japanese were viewed 
in America during WWII. 
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Conclusion 
Regardless of the category immigrants are put in, citizens are still fearful of another 
domestic terror attack. In Coyotes: A Journey Across Borders with America’s Mexican 
Migrants, Ted Conover reasons why the U.S.-Mexico border has U.S. citizens concerned 
and fearful: 
This anxiety is not necessarily anti-immigrant; several of the 9/11 
hijackers were also visa violators, and the fact that two of them received 
new student visas in the mail six months after perishing in the suicide 
attack on the Twin Towers does not bolster one’s confidence in the 
Department of Homeland Security. Though a tiny fraction of the whole, 
migrants from nations besides Mexico use the southern border to sneak 
into the United States too. It seems only a matter of time until a terrorist is 
discovered to have come in via the border with Mexico.52 
 As previously discussed, if a country like the United States claims it has territorial 
jurisdiction, then they are allowed to patrol the border. However, if there has been this 
fear of illegal immigrants entering the country, why has the number of illegal immigrants 
continued to rise? As Douglas Massey answers in Beyond Smoke and Mirrors: Mexican 
Immigration in an Era of Economic Integration, it is due to the failed policies throughout 
the 1990s. The following chapters will specifically look at the policies that were enacted 
and systematically failed. However, Massey argues that when Operation Gatekeeper was 
passed, the majority of immigrants entered the United States through other ways.53 The 																																																								
52 Conover, Ted. Coyotes: A Journey across Borders with America's Illegal Migrants. New York: 
Vintage Books, 2006, 2. 
53 Massey, Douglas S., Jorge Durand, and Nolan J. Malone. Beyond Smoke and Mirrors: Mexican 
Immigration in an Era of Economic Integration. New York: Russell Sage Foundation, 2003. 
31 
immigrants were funneled away from the way that was built in San Diego to entry points 
not in California. The reason why immigration seemed to be under control in the late 
1990s was because immigrants simply snuck into the United States through other entry 
points. 
 With citizens believing the border was under control and with the unemployment 
reaching record lows by the late 1990s, the political debate on illegal immigration seemed 
to have disappeared. “On the contrary, by pushing migration away from urbanized areas 
and toward sparsely populated sectors, the Border Patrol had effectively channeled 
migrants towards portions of the border where they would be less likely to be cause, for 
in addition to being less inhabited, the new crossing points were also less patrolled.”54 
Simply put, these new policies were only decreasing the amount of arrests because illegal 
immigrants were forced to enter the United States at places they were less likely to be 
caught at. Just because there were fewer arrests, does not mean these policies were 
working.  
 As Miller outlined the conditions that must be met, the one condition that almost 
all national security and immigration laws can be related to is the protection of human 
rights. One of these human rights is that the State must maintain the well being of their 
peoples’ health. One reason why this thesis is focusing on the Mexico-U.S. border is 
because of the drug epidemic in the country. As Howard Buffet argues in Our 50-State 
Border Crisis: How the Mexican Border Fuels the Drug Epidemic Across America, 
“federal officials routinely estimate that 90 percent of the illegal drugs smuggled into our 
country are coming from or through Mexico, where the drug cartels have assumed 
unprecedented power through violence and corruption at every level of government and 																																																								
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law enforcement.”55 Buffet illustrates the drug problems he personally saw in Arizona. 
He outlined how he saw the immigration program first-hand from their farm in Arizona, 
which was about fifty miles from the border. He felt like he was in an “active conflict 
zone in the developing world” because of the armed smugglers he would see entering the 
country. “These experiences and investments of my time and resources have convinced 
me that border security is one of the most critical national security issues we face.”56  
Although Buffett’s statements may reflect his personal held beliefs, there also 
exists a factual basis from his claims. Here are just a few facts Buffett wrote about that 
best illustrate the drug problem coming from Mexico. First, an American dies every 
eleven minutes from a drug overdose.57 Remember, about 90 percent of the heroin in the 
United States has come from Mexico.58 Second, the number of drug overdoses kills more 
Americans than motor vehicle accidents, and just in 2016 alone, exceeded the total 
number of U.S. causalities for the duration of the Vietnam War.59 It may seem 
astonishing, but if there were stricter border security measures, these drugs may not enter 
the United States, and there would be less of a threat to American citizens. 
“We have to face reality: Our appetite for illegal drugs and our failure to secure 
the border have had terrible consequences for American citizens and those threats are in 
many ways intensifying.”60 John Kelly, who was the former secretary of Homeland 
Security, addressed the U.S. Senate by proclaiming that  while 3,000 Americans were 																																																								
55 Buffett, Howard G. Our 50 State Border Crisis: How the Mexican Border Fuels the Drug 
Epidemic across America. New York: Hachette Books, 2019. 
56 Id.  
57 Hedegaard H, Miniño AM, Warner M. Drug overdose deaths in the United States, 1999–2017. 
National Center for Health Sciences Data Brief, no 329. Hyattsville, MD: National Center for 
Health Statistics. 2018. 
58 Id. 
59 Id. 
60 Buffett, supra note 55 
33 
killed by terrorism on 9/11, more than half a million have died from illegal drugs. 
Although it is fair for citizens to be nervous of another terrorist attack, another concern 
about having loose border security is the drug traffickers that are killing at all time highs. 
Although this research is not solely focused on the drug cartel problem in the United 
States, it is a valid reason why the research focuses on the U.S.-Mexican border.  
As previously mentioned, drug cartels were the sole purpose of border patrol prior 
to 9/11, but when these terrorist attacks happened, the search for terrorists also was added 
to their to-do list. Buffet concludes his research by outlining his call to action, which is a 
reform of the border patrol. Buffet believes that it would be a mistake to militarize the 
border, but instead expand the border patrol to its own organization like the CIA. 
Buffett’s main call to action is to work more with Mexico, since the majority of 
immigrants who cross into the United States are not criminals. Ultimately, the calls to 
actions are focused at the drug problems that the U.S. faces with Mexico, not necessarily 
just a wall.  
It is clear that illegal immigration should be analyzed by focusing more on the 
conditions at the U.S.-Mexican border. With knowing that most illegal drugs come from 
Mexico, and the rising influx of illegal immigration since the early 1990s, the real 
question is why didn’t presidents Clinton and/or Bush implement stronger border security 
policies to eliminate the issues that are a result from a weak border with Mexico? It has 
been demonstrated why the United States has a right to patrol its borders, yet it is evident 
that failed policies have allowed illegal immigration to grow. In order to best understand 
why illegal immigration still increased after President Clinton's proposed legislation was 
passed by Congress, and why it still increased following the terrorist attacks on 
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September 11, it is imperative to comprehensively look at the failed legislation and what 
went wrong. 
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CHAPTER 3 
“All Americans, not only in the States most heavily affected but in every place in this 
country, are rightly disturbed by the large numbers of illegal aliens entering our 
country… We are a nation of immigrants. But we are also a nation of laws. It is wrong 
and ultimately self-defeating for a nation of immigrants to permit the kind of abuse of our 
immigration laws we have seen in recent years, and we must do more to stop it.”  
-President Bill Clinton, Address before a Joint Session of the Congress on the 
State of the Union, January 24, 199561 
 
 When Bill Clinton was elected to a second term as president of the United States 
in 1996, immigration reform was already underway. It seemed that Clinton’s “strong” 
immigration policies were among many that led him to a successful reelection campaign. 
Immigration policies were discussed in his State of the Union address in 1995: “…since 
1992, we have increased our Border Patrol by over 35 percent; deployed underground 
sensors, infrared night scopes, and encrypted radios; built miles of new fences; and 
installed massive amounts of new lighting.”62 During the 1990s, there was an equitable 
fear due to the significant rise in illegal immigration. According to the Immigration and 
Naturalization Service (INS), there was a rise from 3.5 million unauthorized aliens in 
1990 to 5.8 million by 1996.63 INS estimated that about 41 percent, or 2.1 million, had 
overstayed their visas, while the other 3.7 million were assumed to enter illegally.64 The 
INS also estimated that Mexican undocumented immigrants accounted for 64 percent of 
																																																								
61 President Bill Clinton, Address Before a Joint Session of the Congress on the States of the 
Union (Address to Congress, Washington, DC, January 24, 1995), C-Span, https://www.c-
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all the illegal immigrants in 1996.65 There are only two ways an illegal immigrant can 
enter the country. First, they overstay their visa. This chapter will briefly look at the visa 
waiver program, and the statistical data of the number of illegal immigrants who 
overstay. The second way is through entering illegally across the border. Legislation that 
was passed tried to address both scenarios.  
As such, this chapter looks at the legislation passed to limit illegal immigration. 
Operation Gatekeeper, which aimed to tighten the U.S.-Mexico border, was passed in the 
first term of President Clinton. Then, the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant 
Responsibility Act of 1996 is considered, which was the most transformational 
immigration reform legislation passed during Clinton’s presidency. Next, it is important 
to analyze the policies implemented aimed at strengthening the border, which was 
ultimately unsuccessful as the total number of illegal immigrants rose from 1990 to 2000. 
Finally, considering the Bush presidential campaign in 2000 allows an assessment of 
obtaining the vote of legal Mexican immigrants through a strategy of rhetoric used during 
the campaign and in the early months of the Bush presidency. It will conclude by 
examining the pro-immigration legislation during the first nine months of 2000. This 
analysis will be crucial in seeing the transformation of immigration politics pre and post 
9/11. 
 
Visa Overstay and Statistical Analysis of Illegal Immigration of Mexican Immigrants 
In order for an immigrant to enter and stay in the United States longer than 90 days, they 
must have a U.S Visa. The only exception to this rule is through the Visa Waiver 
Program. The Visa Waiver Program began as a temporary program, known as the Visa 																																																								
65 Id. 
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Waiver Pilot Program, by the Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986. The pilot 
program initially gave foreigners entry into the United States for 90 days or less if they 
were traveling for business or pleasure.66 In order for a country to be a part of this 
program, they must have offered the same services to U.S. citizens while having an 
average non-immigrant refusal rate of 2 percent for the previous two years.67 There was a 
limit of eight countries that could participate in the pilot program before Congress began 
to expand the program through different legislation.68 
Between 1986 and 1997, Congress enacted five significant pieces of legislations 
that made changes to the program, which included the Immigration Technical Corrections 
Act of 1988; the Immigration Act of 1990, which inserted further requirements for the 
program and removed the limit on the number of countries that could participate in the 
program; the Miscellaneous and Technical Immigration and Naturalization Amendments 
of 1991; the Immigration and Nationality Technical Corrections Act of 1994, which 
allowed countries who had higher than the previous 2 percent refusal rate, but less than 
3.5 percent on a probationary basis; and the Illegal Immigrant Reform and Immigrant 
Responsibility Act of 1996, which created a probationary status for the countries that 
failed to meet the criteria, and had a refusal rate officially 3.5 percent instead of 2 
percent.69 
 The pilot program was supposed to end in 1997, however the 105th Congress 
passed resolutions to continue the program. In 1998, Congress passed legislation to 																																																								
66 Department of Homeland Security. Office of Inspector General. The Visa Waiver Program. (2 
November 2012). By Charles K. Edwards, Acting Inspector General. Accessed February 21, 
2019. https://www.oig.dhs.gov/assets/Mgmt/2013/OIG_13-07_Nov12.pdf 
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extend the program until 2000 and also made changes to the standard of what countries 
are selected to participate in the program.70 By 1999, the program had grown from eight 
countries to include 29 countries.71 On October 30, 2000, the Visa Waiver Program was 
signed into law as a permanent program.72 
Although the VWP is one way that immigrants could enter the United States, 
including all of the terrorists who committed crimes on 9/11, Mexico is not an approved 
country for the program.73 Yet Mexican immigration was more than half of the total 
number of undocumented immigrants during the 1990s.74 The Visa Waiver program was 
an integral part of immigration reform in the late 1980s and early 1990s. However, this 
focus was ill advised since the majority of illegal immigrants were not because of this 
program. The Visa Waiver Program is important though because of the focus from 
congress during the 1990s. 
 The majority of illegal immigrants are from Mexico, which saw an increase from 
1990 to 1999. Table 1 illustrates the statistical data from the Office of Policy and 
Planning in the Immigration and Naturalization Services. The INS uses the population 
numbers from the 2000 Census along with a series of analytical evidence. 
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Table 1: Estimated Illegal Immigrant Population, Top 15 Countries: 1990 and 2000 
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 Table 1 illustrates the number of illegal immigrants from 1990 until 2000. The 
estimated illegal immigrant population from Mexico increased from about 2 million in 
1990 to 4.8 million in January 2000.75 Table 1 does not illustrate how many 
undocumented immigrants left the United States. However, the total number of illegal 
immigrants that arrived from 1990 until 1999 was about 4.7 million immigrants.76 
Because there was a rise of 2.8 million, it can be estimated that about 1.9 million illegal 
immigrants were unaccounted for in the United States, which includes being removed by 																																																								
75 U.S. INS Report, supra note 63, at 13. 
76 Id. 
 
 
Country of Birth 
Estimated 
Population in 
January  
 
Percent of 
Total 
 
Growth  
2000 1990 2000 1990 1990-2000 
  All Countries........... 
Mexico ……………… 
El Salvador………...... 
Guatemala.………...... 
Columbia …………… 
Honduras.……………. 
China.……………...... 
Ecuador…………... 
Dominican Republic… 
Philippines…………. 
Brazil……………..... 
Haiti………………… 
India………………… 
Peru…………………. 
Korea……………….. 
Canada………………. 
Other countries……… 
7,000 
4,808 
189 
144 
141 
138 
115 
108 
91 
85 
76 
76 
70 
61 
55 
47 
795 
3,500 
2,040 
298 
118 
51 
42 
70 
37 
46 
70 
20 
67 
28 
27 
24 
25 
537 
100 
68.7 
2.7 
2.1 
2.0 
2.0 
1.6 
1.5 
1.3 
1.2 
1.1 
1.1 
1.0 
0.9 
0.8 
0.7 
11.4 
100 
58.3 
8.5 
3.4 
1.4 
1.2 
2.0 
1.0 
1.3 
2.0 
0.6 
1.9 
0.8 
0.8 
0.7 
0.7 
15.3 
3,500 
2,768 
-109 
26 
91 
96 
45 
71 
45 
14 
58 
8 
41 
34 
31 
22 
259 
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the INS, killed, emigrated, adjusted to lawful status in the United States, or departed 
briefly from the U.S. and return with immigrant visas.  
 Both the total number of illegal immigrants and the percent of illegal immigrants 
increased from Mexico increased during those 10 years. These estimates include all 
illegal immigration from Mexico during the 1990s.77 According to the INS, visa overstay 
in 1996 accounted for roughly 41 percent, or 2.1 million, of the total illegal immigrant 
population.78 Yet only 16 percent of the total number of illegal immigrants from Mexico 
are nonimmigrant overstays.79 Illegal immigration from Mexico rose from 58 percent to 
68 percent from 1990 to 2000. This means that the legislation that was passed was not 
successful in preventing Mexican illegal immigrants from entering. Although visa 
overstay is important, the focus should be preventing them from crossing the border. 
Visa overstay is when an immigrant stays in the United States longer than the 
period of authorized stay, which may have been for several years. Illegal Immigrants who 
overstayed their visas was still a problem for President Clinton, because the legislation 
that he passed was focused on the California-Mexico border, and focused on those who 
were trying to enter illegally. Even though there are a high number of illegal immigrants 
entering through the border, 41 percent of all illegal immigrants overstayed their visas. 
There was not transformative legislation that was passed to lower this number.  
In 1990, there were more than 2 million undocumented immigrants living in the 
United States.80 The Department of Homeland Security does not have comprehensive 
data illustrating how many illegal immigrants specifically from Mexico were deported 																																																								
77 Id. 
78 "Illegal Alien Resident Population." Department of Homeland Security. 
https://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/statistics/illegal.pdf. (Accessed February 19th, 2019) 
79 Id. 
80 Id. 
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during the 1990s, only mass numbers of total immigrants deported. Table 2 illustrates the 
total number of deportations of illegal immigrants.81 
 
 
s. Office of Policy and Planning in the Immigration and Naturalization Services, 2000 
 
  Table 2 illustrates the two categories of deportations: returns and removals. Since 
1927, these are the two categories that are used by the Office of Immigration Statistics.82 
“Removal” is referred to as what most assume deportation means: a lawful removal of an 
illegal immigrant who was living in the United States.83 The term “return” is more 
specific to immigration enforcement action, which usually means being apprehended at 
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the border.84 Instead of having legal proceedings like those individuals who are 
“removed”, these immigrants are simply turned around and sent home. Individuals who 
are “removed” have a more significant punishment, as they can face jail time and/or are 
barred from coming back into the United States for a certain period of time. Those who 
are ”returned” are not necessarily prevented from coming back. 
  When analyzing these two tables, it is shocking that the number of illegal 
immigrants removed or return increased from 1990 to 1999, yet the number of illegal 
immigrants residing in the United States from Mexico continued to increase. Although 
there was an increase of returns at a gradual increase every year, there was five times the 
number of removals in 1999 than in 1990. One hypothesis for why there was still an 
increase of illegal immigration in the United States was because immigrants would 
attempt to return to the United States more than once if they were simply “returned” at 
the border. Roughly 60 percent of illegal immigrants are from Mexico, and of these, more 
than 75 percent of them enter through the border. Knowing this, it is a strong indication 
that illegal immigrants were returning multiple times.  
  The second reason is due to visa overstay. Even if there were a lot of returns at the 
border, there were still ample amounts of immigrants overstaying their visas every year, 
and when the United States only deports 50,000 immigrants like in 1995, the number of 
illegal immigrants residing in the United States will drastically increase.85 Because of the 
lack of data regarding the number of illegal immigrants who overstayed visas and how 
many times on average an illegal immigrant would be returned before entering the U.S., 
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it can only be assumed that it was drastically more than the number being deported. Both 
of these hypotheses are the result of failed policy and implementation of legislation.  
 
Operation Gatekeeper- The Death Trap 
Immigration Policy was at the forefront of political dialogue during Clinton’s first term. 
Following the judicial overturn of Proposition 187, which was approved by voters in 
California, immigration reform was the next likely step.86 Clinton seized the opportunity 
in 1994 and launched “Operation Gatekeeper.” In his address to Congress in 1995 when 
talking about illegal immigration, Clinton proclaimed: 
“The jobs they hold might otherwise be held by citizens or legal 
immigrants. The public service they use impose burdens on our taxpayers. 
That's why our administration has moved aggressively to secure our 
borders more by hiring a record number of new border guards, by 
deporting twice as many criminal aliens as ever before, by cracking down 
on illegal hiring, by barring welfare benefits to illegal aliens. In the budget 
I will present to you, we will try to do more to speed the deportation of 
illegal aliens who are arrested for crimes, to better identify illegal aliens in 
the workplace as recommended by the commission headed by former 
Congresswoman Barbara Jordan.”87 
  Operation Gatekeeper was enacted in order to militarize the border and limit the 
number of illegal immigrants from entering the United States. In Table 1, the number of 																																																								
86 “General Election - Statement of Vote, November 8, 1994”, California Secretary of State, 
statistical data, accessed March 3, 2019, https://www.sos.ca.gov/elections/prior-
elections/statewide-election-results/general-election-november-8-1994/statement-vote/#ssov 
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illegal immigrants in the United States decreased in 1996 and 1997, which is due to these 
policies in Operation Gatekeeper.88 However, it is evident that Operation Gatekeeper was 
only a temporary solution because in the years leading up to 2001, there was a drastic 
increase of illegal immigrants in the United States.89 And although the number of illegal 
immigrants decreased in 1996 and 1997, it was still more immigrants than in 1993.90 
  The goal of Operation Gatekeeper was to deter illegal immigrants from entering 
the southern most border of California, where at the time the majority of immigrants were 
entering. The idea of Operation Gatekeeper was to make it more difficult for illegal 
immigrants to enter into the United States by building a wall in the most traveled paths, 
specifically the California-Mexico border. In addition to the building of a fence, there 
was a significant increase in the number of border agents and the funding for border 
security by the U.S. Government. In the early 1990s, over half a million apprehensions of 
illegal immigrants in the San Diego sector, which is the first fourteen miles from the 
Pacific Ocean inland, of the U.S.-Mexican border accounted for 45 percent of the 
national total.91 Clinton was soon seeking reelection, and illegal immigration paved the 
way to gain national support. He wanted to ensure that he received the votes of 
Californians who had recently voted for Prop 187 and wanted to secure the border in their 
state. 
  Operation Gatekeeper paved the way for the concept of “Gatekeeper Complex,” 
which refers to allocating resources towards the deterrence of illegal immigration along 
traditional migrant routes, which ultimately increased the number of illegal immigrant 																																																								
88 U.S. INS Report, supra note 63, at 13. 
89 Id. 
90 Id. 
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deaths attempting to cross the border.92 Although it should not be the United States 
responsibility if a migrant dies trying to illegally cross the border, the number of illegal 
immigrants crossing the border into the United States still increased during Clinton’s 
presidency. Operation Gatekeeper closed the traditional routes in the San Diego sector by 
constructing a fence and increasing funding along with the number of border patrol 
agents within that first 14 miles inland from the Pacific Ocean, while Operation Blockade 
did similarly in the El Paso sector of the border.93   
  The U.S. subsequently increased border security along the smaller towns near the 
border. This forced illegal immigrants to enter through the sparsely populated desert, 
which ultimately increased the likelihood of death without successfully deterring the 
majority of immigrants.94 Table 3 shows that although illegal immigration apprehensions 
decreased in the San Diego and El Paso sector, it increased in other sections of the 
border.95  
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Source: United States General Accounting Office- Report to Congressional 
Committees.96 
  Table 3 proves that Operation Gatekeeper was viewed as successful only because 
illegal immigration decreased in both the San Diego and El Paso sectors. Immigration 
and Naturalization Services believed that “intensified and targeted control would 
discourage many would-be migrants from even attempting the journey [across the 
Border] because of the additional physical difficulty, and the increased financial and 
psychological costs of the northbound journey.”97 But the INS was wrong, because the 
number of illegal immigrants continued to increase. Ultimately Operation Gatekeeper did 
more to shift immigration patterns rather than lower illegal immigration into the United 
States. 
  Operation Gatekeeper shifted the immigration patterns to a more dangerous, less 
traveled route. Possibly the only more shocking statistic than the number of illegal 																																																								
96  Southwest Border Strategy Implementation 
97 Eschbach et al., supra note 92, at 40-41. 
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immigrants who have successfully entered into the United States would be the number of 
illegal immigrants who have died trying to. Since the implementation of Operation 
Gatekeeper, the number of illegal immigrant deaths attempting to enter California has 
increased by 509 percent, as the death count grew from 23 to 140.98 From 1996 to 2000, 
the number of deaths in Arizona increased from 7 to 90, an increase of 1,186 percent, 
while in Texas the death count grew from 21 to 269, an increase of 1,181 percent.99 The 
INS assumed that a more difficult path to the United States would prevent illegal 
immigration through deterrence, yet the growth in illegal immigrant deaths is concurrent 
with the number of illegal immigrants entering the United States. 
  Clinton portrayed Operation Gatekeeper as a success during his 1996 reelection 
campaign. Clinton knew he needed to win California during his reelection, so it is evident 
that is one factor that influenced his stance on illegal immigration. Clinton ended up 
winning the election by a good margin, due to the fact he won all the states bordering the 
Mexico border, except Texas.100 However, if it was not for Operation Gatekeeper and his 
strong stance on illegal immigration with Mexico, there is a chance Clinton would have 
lost key votes. 
 Although there was a decrease in apprehensions in the San Diego and El Paso sectors, 
the number of illegal immigrants continued to increase during this time. If the increasing 
number of illegal immigrants in the United States is not enough to deem Operation 
Gatekeeper as a failure, then the number of illegal immigrant deaths must correlate to the 
failed policies of the time. Why didn’t Operation Gatekeeper build a complete wall? It is 																																																								
98 Eschbach, Karl, et al. "Death at the Border:' International Migration Review 33.2 (1999): 430-
54. Data from the Mexican Ministry of Foreign Relations 
99 Id. 100	"1982 Arkansas Elections". Arkansas Secretary of State. May 1983. Retrieved May 01, 2019.	
48 
shown that the number of illegal immigrants drastically decreased in the sectors where 
the fences were built, but what would be the result if the wall/fence was completed along 
the entire border? Operation Gatekeeper was incomplete and inefficient, as lives were 
lost and the goal of decreasing illegal immigration was not achieved. 
 
Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996 
Following Operation Gatekeeper in 1994, Clinton continued to ride the auspicious wave 
of immigration reform prior to his reelection campaign in 1996. Clinton realized that 
continued support for immigration reform would help to ensure that he would be elected 
to a second term in 1996 following the mass support of Operation Gatekeeper and other 
legislation that limited illegal immigration. On September 30th, 1996, Clinton signed into 
law the Illegal Immigrant Reform and Responsibility Act of 1996, which was one of the 
most transformative immigration laws of the decade.101 The new law represented the 
immigration initiatives following the Republican takeover of Congress after the 1994 
midterm elections. Although Operation Gatekeeper was significant, the Illegal 
Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act (IIRIRA) set the stage for 
significant U.S. illegal immigration control through stricter enforcement and increasing 
spending on the border. 
  IIRIRA first addresses the most publicly desirable subject of “Improvements to 
Border Control, Facilitation of Legal Entry, and Interior Enforcement.”102 The most 
immediate impact of the bill was that it increased the number of border patrol agents by 
5,000 over the next five years. It also increased the funding by $12 million to the 14-mile 																																																								
101 H.R. 2202, 104th Cong. (September 24, 1996) (enacted). 
102 Id. 
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fence, the same fence that Operation Gatekeeper created, in order to enhance its security. 
The security enhancements for the Immigration and Naturalization Service included 
helicopters, border patrol detection gear and vehicles.103 The IIRIRA also increased the 
civil and criminal penalties for illegal entry by fining every illegal immigrant $50 to 
$250, and the amount is doubled for repeat offenses. 
  Not only was there an increase of border protection, but there were several policy 
changes aimed at illegal immigrants residing in the United States. First, the law seeks to 
expand the staff that detects immigrants who have overstayed their visas. By 1997, there 
was a growth of 300 investigators, and by 1999, there was an increase of another 600.104 
Second, the IRA funded ways to expand nationwide surveillance through fingerprinting 
illegal immigrants arrested in the U.S. And lastly, the legislation took initial steps to 
federalize identification document standards.105  
  What this means is that it required the Social Security Administration to create 
counterfeit-resistant ID cards.106 The IIRIRA ordered the Attorney General to create a 
pilot program to increase employment eligibility verification, which included 
improvement to employment forms and a call-in system that allowed employers to check 
the legal status of job applicants.107 This trial program was only implemented in states 
that wanted to conform to these standards, and was mostly voluntary. It also required 
federal agencies to only accept birth certificates and state ID cards that had similar 
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resistant measures.108 This allowed the security of immigrants who would use counterfeit 
ID cards to enter into the United States. 
  Many of the similar trends and issues that arose with Operation Gatekeeper were 
obstacles with the IIRIRA. The conclusion of this thesis will shed light on what could 
have been improved with the IIRIRA, and which aspects could be considered a failure. 
President Clinton had public support to eliminate the issues that came from the extreme 
increase of illegal immigration, yet only decided to partially fix the issue.  
  Why did President Clinton only build a wall 14 miles inland and then in El Paso 
instead of having extensive immigration deterrence along the entire border? It can be 
argued that there was no way to prove that President Clinton and H.R. 2202’s deterrence 
solutions wouldn’t work, since it was the first extensive immigration policy of the time. 
However, just because there was a decrease of detained immigrants in the San Diego 
sector, doesn’t mean that the policy was a success. The fact remains that illegal 
immigrants were simply coming through less fortified entries.  
  Because the IIRIRA was the first of its kind, and the strictest of its time, the 
criminal aspect of detaining and deporting illegal immigrants created its own set of 
problems. Clinton described the IIRIRA as a bipartisan “landmark immigration reform 
legislation that cracks down on illegal immigration without punishing legal 
immigrants.”109 The “crack down” on illegal immigrants prior to this legislation was very 
limited in scope. The IIRIRA expanded illegal immigration enforcement by increasing 
the involvement of immigrants with the criminal justice system, which is important to 
know the different ways it did, especially prior to 9/11 in order to see the transformation 																																																								
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of immigration policy after the terrorist attacks in 2001. This legislation set the way for 
laws that were passed after September 11th, like the Patriot Act and the Anti-Terrorism 
Act of 2001. 
  There was at least four ways that the IIRIRA increased the involvement of illegal 
immigrants with the criminal justice system. First, the IIRIRA expanded the criminal 
grounds of deportation. The categories of “crimes of moral turpitude” and “aggravated 
felonies” were expanded to include some misdemeanors. The Immigration and 
Nationality Act effectively created to category of “aggravated felonies”, which strips a 
legal immigrant of their citizenship since the degree of crime increased.110 The criminal 
classifications redefined the goals of the immigration system, as it seemed to criminalize 
immigrants who had a green card about to legalize. Although there should be a more 
effective legalization process, if an illegal immigrant commits a crime, there should be 
repercussions.  
  The second way that the IIRIRA increased immigrant involvement with the 
criminal justice system was through the nationwide fingerprinting of illegal immigrants 
that were detained. There were many illegal immigrants that were low-level in the drug 
economy, many low-income Mexican immigrants that were caught in the drug war.111 
The Bureau of Justice Statistics did report that illegal immigrants were more likely than 
legal citizens “to have played a minor role in the drug conspiracy.”112 Since there was an 
expanded category of aggravated felony, it expanded the “criminal alien” classification.  
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  Third, the IIRIRA renamed the term “exclusion” to “removal,” and created an 
expedited deportation process that limited immigrant’s access to discretionary relief. It 
approved the “rescission of legal permanent residency status” affirming that “an order of 
removal issued by an immigration judge shall be sufficient to rescind the alien’s 
status.’’113 What this means is that it expedited the deportation process and allowed 
illegal immigrants apprehended at the border to be immediately removed, even asylum 
seekers without a convincing “credible fear of persecution.”114 It allows INS officials to 
issue orders to illegal immigrants that prevented any relief from deportation.  
  What this meant was that it led to an increase in informal deportations that bypass 
the immigration courts and criminal prosecution.115 There are pros and cons to an 
expedited deportation process. Limited regulation and fewer procedural rights allowed 
many more illegal immigrants to be deported, which meant it was a lot cheaper to deport 
an illegal immigrant. However, this also meant that there was a higher chance that an 
illegal immigrant would attempt to reenter the United States because of the lack of harsh 
punishment. When an illegal immigrant is put through the court system, there are higher 
penalties for reentry, and more information entered into the system on that alien.  
  Finally, the IIRIRA created detention centers for illegal immigrants who have 
been detained.116 Instead of instantaneously deporting an illegal immigrant, there were 
legal steps to process them in addition to other procedures that were mandated. The 
IIRIRA created these detention centers to house illegal immigrants, which created more 
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regulation and costly expenditures for illegal immigration. This created a new market for 
private corporations to build and manage detention centers, but cost the United States 
millions in 1996. The IIRIRA authorized $670 million for state prison grants, with $170 
million made available for “alien incarceration”.117 With a more efficient deportation 
process, it had been hoped that the passage of the IIRIRA would eliminate the time illegal 
immigrants were at deportation centers, thus saving the United States money.  
  The IIRIRA also allowed for the deportation of illegal immigrants that had been 
here for several decades even if they committed misdemeanor crimes 20 years ago.118 
Although it is important to prevent illegal immigrants from staying in the United States, it 
can be argued that if an illegal immigrant has not committed any felony crime, should 
they immediately be deported without an opportunity to apply for residency? However, 
most Americans have little sympathy for illegal immigrants who commit felony crimes.  
 
President George W. Bush – The 2000 Presidential Election  
 The election of President George W. Bush in 2000 seemed to mark a transition in 
United States immigration policy. In his presidential campaign during 1999, then-Texas 
Governor Bush claimed immigration reform was one of his national priorities, 
particularly since he was targeting the swing Latino votes in California, New Mexico, 
Arizona, Texas, Florida, and New York. "For those who want to wall off Mexico from 
Texas, I say you're dead wrong," Bush proclaimed in 1998. "For people who want to 
isolate Mexico from Texas through a psychological war of words, there could be nothing 																																																								
117 IIRIRA, supra note 100, at 105 
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worse. We share problems, we share a long border. But the best way to solve our 
common problems is to do so in the spirit of friendship and to treat each other decently." 
Even when California Governor Wilson endorsed Prop 187, Governor Bush was an 
advocate against it since it would have eliminated everything but emergency services to 
illegal immigrants. “Children already living in Texas should not be denied an education 
because of where they were born”, Bush said when visiting Mexico in 1995. In an 
interview with Francisco Barrio, who was then governor of Chihuahua state, which 
borders Texas, said that Governor Bush said, “Every child of an undocumented family in 
Texas will have access to health services and education, at least while I am governor”. In 
a 1995 speech Governor Bush encouraged Congress to bail Mexico out of its economic 
troubles, “What is good for Mexico is good for the United States.” 
  This rhetoric was prevalent during his 1999 presidential campaign. During his 
campaign, he emphasized his connections to Mexico, reminding Latino voters that he 
spoke Spanish and that his brother Jeb Bush, who was then Florida’s Governor, was 
married to a Mexican American woman. He also reminded the voters of how he traveled 
as Texas governor to Mexico to improve border relations with Mexico. During one of the 
televised presidential debates, referring to Mexico's President-elect Vincent Fox, “He’s a 
man I know from Mexico.”  Bush was the first candidate to use a Spanish-language ad in 
a presidential primary. When candidate and then-President Clinton campaigned in 
California, he did not need to key on the Hispanic vote because statistics had shown that 
the majority of Latinos voted Democrat in recent elections. Republican candidate George 
Bush and his chief political strategist, Karl Rove, realized their top goal was to gain 
confidence with Latino voters. The Latino population represented the largest minority 
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group in the United States. The Census Bureau population projections at the time 
expected dramatic decrease of white non-Hispanics, predicting a drop from 72 percent in 
2000 to 64 percent by 2020 and 53 percent by 2050.119  
  In 1999, it was imperative for candidate Bush to dramatically increase his 
Mexican vote if he was to win the election. In the 1996 Presidential election, the 
Republican Party won only 21 percent of the Hispanic vote compared to the 72 percent 
who voted Democrat. This seemed surprising following President Clinton's strict 
immigration policies during his first term, but it illustrated the policy emphasis of the 
time.120  
  In a dramatic increase from the previous Republican Party candidate, Bush 
nationally  received 35 percent of the Hispanic vote, a 14-point swing from the 1996 
election. These votes turned out to be crucial since the 2000 election was one of the most 
controversial ever. Florida ended up being the swing state and was necessary for Bush to 
win the presidency. On election night, Democrat Al Gore was declared the winner very 
early by national media stations. However, the next day Bush was declared the winner by 
a very close margin. Gore challenged the result due to inaccurate “butterfly ballots”, 
which referred to the ballots that were not fully punched through, but the Supreme Court 
overturned Gore’s challenge, which led to Bush winning Florida by 537 votes.121 Bush’s 
campaign efforts toward Hispanic voters was definitely evident in the Florida campaign, 
since the non-Cuban Hispanic vote was split in Florida, 48 percent for Gore to 49 percent 
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for Bush.122 The extra percent was the different between winning and losing the 2000 
presidential election.  
  Since several Republicans in Congress also wanted to gain support of Hispanic 
voters in their elections throughout the country, they proposed the Agricultural Job 
Opportunity Benefits and Security Act of 1999. This legislation was introduced to help 
create an easier path for immigrants who were working and contributing to the United 
States economy. However, it was not passed because many members of Congress wanted 
to wait and see what immigration legislation that was going to be proposed by President 
Bush. It was clear that there was going to be new immigration reform in the early years of 
the Bush presidency.  
 
2001 – Months prior to 9/11 
During the first nine months of the Bush presidency, there were significant changes in 
immigration policy. Bush was focused on making the citizenship process more efficient. 
There were three major legislation proposals during these first nine months. First, both 
chambers unanimously approved short-term extensions of section 245(i) of the 
Immigration and Nationality Act (INA). This provision allowed illegal immigrants to be 
eligible for green cards to become lawful, permanent residents without having to leave 
the country first. Second, there were bipartisan groups in both chambers that introduced 
versions of the Development, Relief, and Education for Alien Minors (DREAM) Act, 
which legalized the children who had entered the United States illegally and had 
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graduated high school and attended college.123 Rep. Chris Cannon (R-UT) introduced this 
legislation in the House with 62 bipartisan cosponsors, and by Sen. Orrin Hatch (R-UT) 
in the Senate with 18 bipartisan cosponsors. Lastly, there was a pair of AgJOBS bills that 
were introduced with support from both sides of the aisle. The Republican-backed 
Agricultural Job Opportunity Benefits and Security (AgJOBS) Act of 2001 (S. 1161) was 
introduced by Sen. Larry Craig (R-ID) on July 10, 2001, and the Democratic H-2A 
Reform and Agricultural Worker Adjustment Act (HR 2736) was introduced during the 
107th Congress by Rep. Howard Berman (D-CA) on August 2, 2001.124  
  The DREAM Act was a bipartisan effort that proves there was major immigration 
reform beginning to happen before the 9/11 terrorist attacks. It is evident that Congress 
was focused on making the legalization process more efficient. However, there were no 
provisions in this proposal to focus on strengthening the border to prevent more illegal 
immigrants from entering the country.  
  The DREAM Act was a progressive immigration measure because it was aimed at 
legalizing children who achieved certain education milestones in the United States. These 
included attending and graduating from an institution of higher learning, being of a 
certain age to apply, being physically present in the U.S. for a certain number of years, 
having good moral character, and having not violated other immigration laws.125 These 
children were referred to as “DREAMers”, which defined them as individuals who were 
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brought into the country at a young age by parents who illegally immigrated and 
assimilated into American culture and educated in the United States.  
  The DREAM Act of 2001 failed to pass during the 107th Congress, in part 
because of how most Americans reacted to the terrorist attacks of September 11, the 
predicted focus on terrorism, and new attitudes on illegal immigration in general.   
 President Bush strongly supported the DREAM Act and the other immigration reform 
efforts. During his campaign, he promised to speed up the immigration processing for 
immigrant families and employers. Bush argued that “immigration is not a problem to be 
solved; it is the sign of a successful nation.”126 President Bush’s passion in U.S.-Mexico 
relation was fueled by his relationship with the newly elected Mexican President, Vicente 
Fox. Fox became Mexico’s first democratically elected leader, and had campaigned on 
similar messages of improving the U.S.-Mexico relationship. President Bush saw the 
improvement of U.S.-Mexico relations as his “signature foreign policy legacy”, thus 
President Bush and Mexican President Fox met five times during the first nine months of 
2001.127  Some analysts described this fruition as an “absolutely historic transition from a 
hostile relationship to a cooperative relationship,” and anticipated “more and more a kind 
of merged country on the border.”128 
  Conversations specifically to U.S.-Mexico relations were initiated by a binational 
task force that specifically dealt with the U.S.-Mexico relationship. Thomas F. McLarty, 
President Clinton’s first chief of staff, chaired this task force along with Andres Rozental, 																																																								
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a former Mexican senior diplomat. This group met throughout 2000 and released the 
report Mexico-US Migration: A Shared Responsibility in February 2001 just before the 
two presidents met for the first time.129 The group even laid out a negotiation agenda, 
which became their starting point for conversation, in the memo “Memorandum to 
Presidents George W. Bush and Vicente Fox.” 
 Following the meeting between both presidents, the Secretary of State and the 
Attorney General of the United States and the Mexican ministers of foreign relations 
chaired a Working Group on Migration. “They tasked the group with developing a 
comprehensive bilateral migration deal encompassing legalization, border enforcement, 
and a new temporary visa program. In May, the countries announced a pair of border 
initiatives to discourage illegal migration through high-risk areas and to cooperate on 
humanitarian search-and-rescue operations.”130 At this time, President Bush and his 
administration were discussing the possibility of a “grand bargain” that would legalize a 
mass majority of illegal immigrants in the Unites States. This “grand bargain”, which was 
referred to as the “whole enchilada” in Castaneda’s memo phrase, would include a 
bilateral guest work program, along with a larger Mexican presence at the border.131  
  On September 6th 2001, just five days before the terrorist attacks on 9/11, Bush 
held a summit with Fox. At this summit, Fox challenged Bush to move the negotiations 
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further, which led to both presidents formally committing to complete a deal by the end 
of the year. Bush said at this September 6th summit: 
And that is there are -- one of the things I have told the President is I am 
willing to consider ways for a guest worker to earn a green card status. 
And yet I fully recognize there are a lot of people who have stood in line, 
who have said, I'll abide by the laws of the United States.  And we're 
trying to work through a formula that will not penalize the person who's 
chosen the legal route, and at the same time recognizes the contribution 
that the undocumented has made…. he's [President Fox] asked that we do 
it within the year.  One thing he will find is that we will put 100 percent 
effort into it during the year.  And I hope we can come up with a solution; 
I want to accommodate my friend. 
This summit also produced agreement on a new public-private “Partnership for 
Prosperity”, which was an agreement for the United States to promote investment in 
Mexico in order to reduce emigration pressures. The mission statement of this partnership 
is “To help address some of the root causes of migration, [President Fox and President 
Bush] agreed to form a public-private alliance to spur private sector growth throughout 
Mexico. This '' initiative will harness the power of free markets to boost the social and 
economic well being of citizens particularly in regions where economic growth has 
lagged and fueled migration. The development of this alliance will be spearheaded by 
senior-level coordinators on both sides, and will draw on the best expertise among 
Mexican and U.S. economists, business people and civil society to develop a concrete 
plan of action to be presented to the Presidents not later than March 1, 2002.”  
61 
 There was earnest progress in immigration reform, although it was not focused on 
prevention of immigrants since it was more aimed at the legalization of those illegal 
immigrants who have been working and living in the United States for many years. All of 
this seemed encouraging for the future until just a few days later. As the terrorist attacks 
of September 11, 2001 changed the United States, it also drastically changed what 
Americans were willing to accept in the way of new immigration policies. 
 
Conclusion 
Illegal immigration was a major social, economic, and political concern to Americans in 
the 1990s. President Clinton succeeded in getting reelected in 1996 because of his 
immigration reform policies. Although a federal appeals court had ruled Prop 187 
unconstitutional, it had still been passed by California voters and was very much a hot 
topic. It's clear that Americans were tired of immigration problems from illegal migrants  
entering the United States. Operation Gatekeeper was President Clinton’s solution to the 
problem, which built 14 miles of wall from the Pacific Ocean inland. However, as the 
numbers of illegal immigrant crossings and deportation increased during President 
Clinton's terms so did the total number of illegal immigrants residing in the United States. 
Operation Gatekeeper was seen by some as a success because of the limited number of 
immigrants who entered the California-Mexico border in the San Diego sector, meaning 
it was a success for 14 miles of the 1,954-mile southern border. However, the success of 
the 14-mile wall also funneled immigrants to a more dangerous terrain, which increased 
border crime and the number of illegal immigrants who died trying to cross the border.  
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 The Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996 is 
seen as one of the most transformative immigration reform laws ever passed. These strict 
immigration guidelines increased federal government spending for security at the border. 
The number of illegal immigrants who entered the United States decreased in 1996 and 
1997. However, the numbers shot back up in 1998 and 1999 as Congress relaxed 
immigration policies and unsuccessfully tried to create policies that would legalize illegal 
immigrants who were already living in the United States. Policies like the DREAM Act 
and Agricultural Job Opportunity Benefits and Security Act of 1999 only increased the 
number of illegal immigrants who believed the risk of deportation was worth their 
attempt to live in the United States. 
 Republican candidate Bush heavily campaigned for the Latino voters and was the 
first presidential candidate to use an ad in Spanish. This ad and his campaign to champion 
Hispanic causes led him to win 35 percent of the Hispanic vote, which was the most a 
Republican had received in decades. President Bush had a personal relationship with 
newly elected Mexican President Vicente Fox, and worked closely with him in the first 
nine months of 2001. There were major improvements in the early relationship between 
the United States and Mexico and some analysts have said it was the best relationship in 
recent history between the United States and Mexico. The September 6, 2001 summit had 
truly opened the door for future cooperation between the two nations.  
 But five days later, the landscape of the United States and the world was changed 
forever as the horror of the four terrorist attacks on September 11 shocked Americans in 
every corner of the country. The relationship with Mexico quickly changed when national 
security and border security became the top priority over immigration issues. All future 
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talks between the United States and Mexico were put on hold. President Bush's new focus 
was to secure the southern border to ensure that terrorists could not cross into the United 
States.  
 The terrorist attacks just five days after the United States-Mexico summit 
completely transformed the immigration narrative. It was a missed opportunity. 
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CHAPTER 4 
On the morning of September 11, 2001, 19 militants connected to the radical Islamic 
terrorist group al-Qaeda killed nearly 3,000 people and injured over 6,000 others. In less 
than two hours in a series of four coordinated attacks, the U.S. faced at least $10 billion 
in property and infrastructure damage, totaling to $3 trillion in total costs.132 Americans 
were engulfed with anger and anguish, imposed with the realization that not all illegal 
immigrants were filled with peace, searching for prosperity. As the country began to 
mourn, politicians began to question how the largest domestic terrorist attack since Pearl 
Harbor transpired. As emergency disaster trainer and ACPO activist Kelly Sharp wrote 
describing the events of 9/11: “These attacks fundamentally changed the way people in 
the U.S. viewed our invincibility and brought terrorism to our front door. Today, 
although Osama bin Laden is dead, terrorism remains a threat to the United States and the 
possibility of another event like 9/11 cannot be discounted.”  
There were significant changes following the 9/11 attacks. Just when analysts 
alleged a positive relationship with Mexico was cultivating, the terror attacks destroyed 
any such thought. How could the United States have allowed terrorists into the country? 
Politicians sought to answer this question. President Bush and his administration 
promptly focused on national security through the enactment of legislation intended to 
prevent terrorists from entering the country. It is clear that immigration policy became 
intertwined with national security, as most of the laws passed directly impacted illegal 
immigration from Mexico.  
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The national security skyline has changed for the United States since September 
11, 2001. Although changes have been made to toughen the Visa Waiver Program, it can 
be argued that the United States was still vulnerable because of how applicants were 
vetted under VWP regulations. All of the 19 terrorists who were directly involved in the 
9/11 attacks would have still be cleared to enter the United States years after 2001 
because they all came from countries protected by the Visa Waiver Program. Fifteen of 
the 19 hijackers were citizens of Saudi Arabia while the others were from the United 
Arab Emirates, Egypt, and Lebanon. Even Zacarias Moussaoui, who was convicted and 
sentenced to six life terms in 2006 as a terrorist conspirator, entered the United States as a 
French citizen through the Visa Waiver Program.  
Following 9/11, new screening systems and databases were quickly developed to 
make it easier to link biographic, immigration, and criminal histories for applicants. This 
resulted in a new level of cooperation among federal, state, and local law enforcement 
agencies. ICE also played a major role in the new policies in the Visa Security Program, 
which vets individuals against intelligence data and terrorist watch lists. Other visa 
programs like the U.S. Visitor and Immigration Status Indicator Technology program, the 
Student and Exchange Visitor Information System, and the Electronic System for Travel 
Authorization have promoted a new generation of agency cooperation to help limit 
domestic terrorism. 
 The terrorists who committed these heinous acts entered with student and visitor 
visas through the Visa Waiver program, thus immigration processes became the 
immediate topic of concern in the aftermath. The public debates and those in Congress 
intertwined the concepts of national security and immigration. This was expected as those 
66 
who committed the terrorist attacks on 9/11 entered the United States through the 
immigration system. If there were stricter immigration policies, would these terrorists 
have been able to enter into the United States? There is no way of knowing, but it is safe 
to say that it would have been more difficult for them to do so. There were five 
momentous national security measures that also affected immigration in critical ways 
over the next four years: 1) The Anti-Terrorism Act of 2001,133 2) The United and 
Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tolls Required to Intercept and 
Obstruct Terrorist Act of 2001, known as the Patriot Act,134 3) the Enhanced Border 
Security and Visa Entry Reform Act (EBSVERA),135 4) the Homeland Security Act of 
2002,136 and 5) the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act (IRTPA).137  
 This chapter will first look at the illegal immigration statistics post-9/11. Because 
there was a larger public focus on national security, was there some implication on the 
number of illegal immigrants who entered the country? Following this statistical analysis, 
the chapter will further look at the five major national security measures after 9/11. It will 
analyze the implementation of such polices that subsequently led to the continuous 
increase of illegal immigrants. Following this analysis, the chapter will look at a few 
other initiatives, including the Secure Border Initiative. This chapter will also analyze 
how Border Patrol changed following 9/11, and will conclude by looking at the Secure 
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Fence Act of 2006. These topics will be analyzed through the lens of change following 
the September 11th terrorist attacks.  
 
Illegal Immigration following 9/11 Terrorist Attacks 
With all of these immigration and national security measures, it would be expected that 
illegal immigration would have drastically decreased in the years following 2001. When 
looking at the data, it is clear that illegal immigration was not affected by these “national 
security” measures. A record number of illegal immigrants entered the country in the five 
years following 9/11. 
Table 4- Country of Birth of the Illegal Immigrant Population: January 2000 and 
2005 (in thousands) 
 
 
Country of Birth 
Estimated 
Population in 
January 
 
Percent of 
Total 
Percent 
Change 
Average 
Annual 
Change 
2000 2005 2000 2005 2000 to 
2005 
2000 to 
2005 
  All Countries............. 
Mexico 
……………… 
El Salvador………...... 
Guatemala.………...... 
India 
………………… 
China.……………...... 
Korea.……………...... 
Philippines…………... 
Honduras……………. 
Brazil……………….. 
Vietnam……………... 
Other countries……… 
8,460  
4,680  
430  
290  
120  
190  
180  
200  
160  
100  
160  
1,950 
10,500 
5,970 
470 
370 
280 
230 
210 
210 
180 
170 
160 
2,250 
100 
55 
5 
3 
1 
2 
2 
2 
2 
1 
2 
23 
100 
 57 
  4 
  4 
  3 
  2 
  2 
  2 
  2 
  2 
  2 
 21 
24 
28 
9 
28 
133 
21 
17 
5  
13 
70 
- 
15 
408  
258  
8  
16  
32  
8  
6  
2  
4  
14  
-  
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s. Department of Homeland Security, 2016 
 
 The increase in illegal immigration could illustrate that the initiatives passed were 
a failure. If five major national security/illegal immigration policies were unable to stop 
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illegal immigrants from coming into the United States, how could it be believed that they 
stopped any terrorists from entering into the country? The table illustrates that the largest 
portion were still coming from Mexico. Was nothing implemented during this time to 
prevent illegal immigrants from coming over the United States-Mexico border? To assess 
this issue, it is necessary to understand what policies were passed immediately following 
9/11. In addition to the number of illegal immigrants who entered the country, it is also 
important to look at the numbers of illegal immigrants who were removed or returned.  
                            Table 5 – Removals and Returns 2000 to 2005 
Year Removals Returns 
2000 188,467 1,675,876 
2001 189,026 1,349,371 
2002 165,168 1,012,116 
2003 211,098 945,294 
2004 240,665 1,166,576 
2005 246,431 1,096,920 
                     s. Department of Homeland Security, 2016 
 
 When analyzing both tables, it is important to note that the number of removals 
increased while the number of returns decreased. Does this mean that there was an 
improvement in border security after 9/11? But then why did the total number of illegal 
immigrants continue to rise? There was legislation that was passed following 9/11, 
however it did not contribute to the number of illegal immigrants in the United States. 
Both of these tables illustrate that although there was a focus on national security, 
policies aimed at strengthening the border should be deemed unsuccessful, as they did not 
prevent the number of illegal immigrants from entering into the United States.  
 The number of removals increasing does show that there was a greater focus in 
deporting illegal immigrants that were already in the United States. However, the total 
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number of illegal immigrants continued to increase from 2000 to 2005. There are two 
possible reasons for this. First, there was a higher increase of visa overstays in the United 
States from 2000 to 2005. The second hypothesis is that illegal immigrants were getting 
more creative and finding new routes into the United States without getting detected. 
Let’s first look at the number of visa overstays from 2000 to 2005. The Department of 
Homeland Security does not have a precise number of visa overstay, because it is almost 
impossible to exactly know how many leave or how many stay without telling the 
government. There have been some studies to estimate the number of illegal immigrants 
who might have overstayed their visa by looking at the net growth, but all of those 
numbers are just estimates. 
To check the hypothesis of illegal immigrants taking new paths into the United 
States, the number of illegal immigrant deaths trying to cross the border is an essential 
statistic. The U.S. Border Patrol reported an increase of deaths in the Southwest Border, 
which could indicate that illegal immigrants were attempting more difficult paths into the 
country because of the increased focus on national security. In 2000, there were 380 
deaths in the Southwest Border, which increased to 492 in 2005.138 There was a decrease 
in the San Diego sector, but an increase in the Tucson area. This indicates that illegal 
immigrants were taking the more difficult paths through the desert. The increase of illegal 
immigrants and the decreasing number of returns indicates that the policies passed were 
not effectively enacted. In order to understand why the policies were unable to prevent 
the rising number of illegal immigrants, it is important to analyze the policies themselves. 
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Anti-Terrorism Act of 2001 and the Patriot Act 
Eight days following the 9/11 attacks, President Bush and his administration submitted to 
Congress the Anti-Terrorism Act of 2001. The goal of this legislation was to expand the 
authority to gather domestic intelligence, combat the money laundering that is used in 
terrorist financing, and to expedite the judicial procedures to deport suspected terrorists. 
This initial proposal had backlash, as some legislators opposed parts of the Act that 
would allow for the indefinite detention of noncitizens. But with the Bush administration 
pushing for an expedited judicial procedure and indefinite detention, the United and 
Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept and 
Obstruct Terrorism Act of 2001, known as the USA PATRIOT Act, passed in October 
2001 with near unanimous support in both chambers.139 The Patriot Act passed in the 
House with a 356 to 66 vote, while also in the Senate with a 98 to 1 vote.  
Following 9/11, Congress and the Bush administration placed a new importance 
on immigration, even though there was a focus on immigration policy prior to the 
terrorist attacks. Instead of building the relationship with Mexico and other foreign 
countries, there was an emphasis on securing the borders to prevent future terrorists from 
entering into the United States. Although the terrorists did not enter through the U.S.-
Mexican border and were not from Mexico, Mexican immigrants felt a large burden from 
the Patriot Act. The mission of the Patriot Act is to "deter and punish terrorist acts around 
the world [and] to enhance law enforcement investigatory tools.140 The Patriot Act limits 																																																								
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the phrase “national security.” Instead, the terms “terrorism” and “terrorist acts” are used. 
The Patriot act expanded the definition of “terrorist activity” that allowed for the removal 
of illegal immigrants convicted of assault and similar crimes. 
The term “terrorism” is difficult to define. Does terrorism include domestic 
crimes like murder or assault? At what point is mass murder considered terrorism? This 
confusion in the definition created many questions regarding the Patriot Act. The Act 
does define “domestic terrorism” as crimes that involve endangering human lives, which 
intended to either intimidate the civilian population or to influence government policy by 
intimidation or coercion, or to affect the workings of government by mass destruction, 
assassination, or kidnapping.141  However, “terrorist activity” included those who were 
charged with an “aggravated felony.” This is not what one normally associates with the 
concept of “terrorism.” Illegal immigrants who were committing crimes that would not 
be considered “normal” terrorist activities were grouped into the same category as those 
criminals conducting typical terrorist crimes. The Patriot Act also made a spouse or child 
of such “terrorists” inadmissible. An illegal immigrant may also be deemed inadmissible 
for being “associated to a terrorist organization,” which is a broad term and creates a 
guilty by association scenario.142 The Patriot Act also increased funds for enforcement of 
the U.S./Canada border. 
The main criticisms of the Patriot Act are related to the expansion of government 
powers that extend farther than needed, which infringe on constitutional rights. The 
Patriot act added government surveillance powers. It allowed wiretap orders to be 
allowed for a wider range of suspected crimes. The Patriot Act also created “sneak and 																																																								
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peek” search warrants. Usually there was a notice of a search warrant in order to permit 
the subject of the search to invoke their Fourth Amendment rights, like being able to 
point out the deficiencies in the warrant, which gives protection against “unreasonable 
searches and seizures,” however the Patriot Act eliminated such notice. The Patriot Act 
allowed voicemails to be seized, instead of only allowing a wiretap. All of these 
provisions were also aimed at non-violent crimes like computer offenses, which was 
heavily criticized. “Sneak and Peek” warrants created concern because of the ability to 
use them in non-terrorism cases, including illegal immigration cases. 
 The most important contribution of the Patriot Act to illegal immigration is the 
mandatory detention until deportation of “certified” aliens “suspected of terrorist 
involvement,” which is Section 412 of the Act. Under that section, the Attorney General 
may permanently detain an illegal immigrant if he/she has “reasonable grounds to 
believe” the alien endangers U.S. national security.143 Before the Patriot Act, it was very 
specific in why an illegal immigrant could be excluded or deported, like an attempt to 
overthrow the government or terrorist activities, with almost not interpretation needed. 
Now, the Attorney General interpreted the law, and had the power to deport an illegal 
immigrant based on “reasonable grounds to believe” he/she endangers national security. 
However, if the Attorney General certifies an illegal immigrant, meaning the illegal 
immigrant fits the categories that were expanded by the Patriot Act like being associated 
with an extremist group or commits a crime against national security, the illegal 
immigrant must be taken into custody. Within seven days of the detention, the Attorney 
General must place the alien in removal proceedings or charge them with a criminal 																																																								
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offense. If there is not any immigration or criminal charge filed, the illegal immigrant 
must be released. The Patriot Act says, “Detention ends if the alien is determined not to 
be removable.” This section also includes specifics on what to do with an illegal 
immigrant who has been certified by the Patriot Act who has not been deported within 90 
days. This section allows an extended duration of detention for additional six-month 
periods "only if the release of the alien will threaten the national security of the United 
States or the safety of the community or any person”144 
 Prior to these changes in Section 412, illegal immigrants that were suspected of 
terrorism could be arrested based on terrorist offenses. The INS had discretion to decide 
whether an illegal immigrant should be released on bail or not, depending if they are a 
risk to national security or there is a risk they would miss the immigration hearings. 
“Under the new law, detention is mandatory for aliens certified by the Attorney General, 
and any alien that the government has ‘reasonable grounds to believe’ meets any of the 
broad grounds for inadmissibility or deportation in section 412, or is otherwise 
considered a national security threat, may be certified … Certified aliens are 
automatically ineligible for bail; there is no opportunity for an adversarial hearing to 
contest their detention. In sum, section 3412 introduces an irrefutable presumption that 
aliens subject to certification are unfit for release.”145 
 The major question that was asked by U.S. citizens and politicians was whether 
the Act constitutes the most relevant and appropriate response to the threat of terrorism. 
Section 412 was the way the Patriot Act affected illegal immigrants from Mexico, and 																																																								
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may have been a contributing factor to the reasons why there was an increase in removals 
from 2000 to 2005.   
 
The Enhanced Border Security and Visa Entry Reform Act 
Within four months of passing the Patriot Act, Congress passed the Enhanced Border 
Security and Visa Entry Reform Act (EBSVERA), signed into law in May of 2002.146 
This legislation is one of the most comprehensive legislation aimed at illegal immigration 
passed in response to the 9/11 terrorist attacks. The EBSVERA focused on securing the 
borders by providing funding to do so. There are three main points of this act that are 
most important in improving the United States ability to control the borders. These 
include: 1) the requirement that the INS make an internal database that would allow an 
illegal immigrant be found with one single search, 2) the requirement that federal law 
enforcement and other intelligence agencies share data regarding illegal immigrants with 
the INS and state department, and 3) the requirement that travel and entry documents like 
visas, be machine-readable and tamper-resistant. The EBSVERA also initiated an 
increase of 3,000 immigration inspectors and investigators.147 
 Although the Enhanced Border Security and Visa Entry Reform Act may have 
immediately helped with illegal immigration, many of the deadlines mandated by 
Congress took many years to be implemented. One reason for this is because of the 
Homeland Security Act, which created much confusion and chaos within the government. 
In the Enhanced Border Security and Visa Entry Reform Act, a deadline of 15 months 
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was included for the illegal immigration reforms.148 However, as of December 1, 2003, 
there were nine of the required reforms in the Reform Act that had not passed yet, where 
four of those nine were implemented long after the deadlines.149 By 2005, the nine 
reforms were not enacted yet. 
 One of the most important reforms that was passed by EBSVERA was the 
creation of an integrated data system, which was referred to as Chimera. This system was 
supposed to include biometric identifiers, immigration and law enforcement records, and 
intelligence information on every applicant. Before 9/11, the INS had multiple systems 
that were not compatible with each other, even with other law enforcement agencies like 
the FBI. For example, the INS had individual databases for criminal/illegal immigrants, 
for naturalization applicants, and for lawful immigrant residents.150 This lack of 
communication is one of the reasons why 9/11 happened. Khalid al Midhar, who was one 
of the terrorists on American Airlines Flight 77 was identified by the CIA as a terrorist on 
January 2001. But because the databases were separate from the INS, he was admitted 
into the United States in August of 2001. This system was never created by the United 
States, which illustrates some of the failed policies following 9/11. Although this 
integrated system that was passed stalled, there were improvements with information 
sharing. Following the creation of the DHS, an interim system was implemented that 
allows for easier searches in the CIA and DHS systems. 
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 The Enhanced Border Security and Visa Entry Reform Act of 2002 would have 
significantly improved the security of the visa process if it was fully implemented. Many 
aspects of this legislation were not, which illustrates the increase of illegal immigration 
during this time. The main reason why many of the pieces of this legislation were not 
implemented was because of the complexity of the Homeland Security Act that was 
passed just six months later. 
 
The Homeland Security Act of 2002 
 The Homeland Security Act was passed on November 25, 2002, and established the 
United States Department of Homeland Security, one of the most important acts passed 
during that era.151 The primary mission of the Homeland Security Act is to “prevent 
terrorist attacks within the United States, reduce the vulnerability of the United States to 
terrorism, and minimize damage and assist in recovery for terrorist attacks that occur in 
the United States.”152 The Homeland Security Act brought together all of the 22 federal 
agencies and 170,000 federal employees into a new agency, called the Department of 
Homeland Security (DHS).153 This was the largest and most complex reorganization of 
the federal government since the Department of Defense was created after World War II. 
Although the concluding chapter will argue President Bush should have taken advantage 
of this time to effectively implement policies to limit the number of illegal immigrants, 
he did take full advantage of the time to implement personnel reform in the federal 
government. 																																																								
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 This personnel reform allowed Bush to appoint colleagues to positions in the 
DHS, like Pennsylvania governor Tom Ridge as the president’s senior advisor. Merging 
22 different agencies posed many challenges, as there were 17 different unions, 77 
existing collect bargaining agreements, 22 human resources servicing office, and eight 
payroll systems. Representative Rob Portman, then a member of the House Select 
Committee on Homeland Security, stated how "It's absolutely critical, if this department 
is going to work, that the President be able to take the 22 different personnel systems ... 
and meld them together in a way that we ... make an effective agency to combat 
terrorism. The agility of the terrorist needs to be matched by a more agile federal 
workforce.”154 
 Although there were many complaints with how the Act was written, and even 
though there seemed to be a lot of logistical issues, because it was within a year of the 
terrorist attacks, the phrase “national security” was very powerful. This is an example of 
a piece of legislation that passed because of the rhetoric towards preventing another 9/11 
attack. “Administrative reform emerges and is successfully enacted when the timing is 
right and opportunity is recognized. Otherwise, the imperative for change can be lost to 
other more pressing priorities.”155 This concept will be used heavily in the conclusion to 
argue how both Presidents Clinton and Bush could have enacted more efficient illegal 
immigration reform policies. The Homeland Security Act of 2002 is a perfect example of 
this.  One of the agencies in the Homeland Security Act that directly affected the focus on 
the border was the creation of ICE. However, there was little effectiveness by this 																																																								
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department until many years later because of the newness of the department. This is one 
reason why the number of removals increased by 35 percent from 2002 to 2003.  
 Although the reorganization was a major change with the Department of 
Homeland Security, there was a significant change with the mission of the DHS and 
Border Patrol post 9/11. The INS mission was focused on preventing illegal immigrants 
from entering the United States. The DHS’s mission is focused on national security. This 
is a major difference when comparing two departments focused on illegal immigration, 
because now border patrol has to worry about preventing not only an illegal immigrant 
into the country, but must be worried about preventing a terrorist from entering. The 
mission of the Homeland Security is “to ensure a homeland that is safe, secure, and 
resilient against terrorism and other hazards.”156 From that statement alone, it is evident 
that terrorism and national security play an important role in the decisions of illegal 
immigration. Prior to the DHS, the INS was solely focused on preventing illegals from 
coming into the United States, without the joint mission of terrorism. The focus on 
terrorism is an important shift, because it drastically increases the responsibility of the 
DHS. 
 
The Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act 
The final major legislation that Congress passed was the Intelligence Reform and 
Terrorism Prevention Act (IRTPA). This legislation was approved 96-2 in the Senate and 
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336-75 in the House, and was signed by President Bush on December 17, 2004.157 This 
law established the position of Director of National Intelligence, the National 
Counterterrorism Center, and the Privacy and Civil Liberties Oversight Board. The 
IRTPA mainly addressed the 9/11 Commission’s recommendations to create an Office of 
the Director of National Intelligence and also to fund additional surveillance and border 
enforcement. 
 The IRTPA was not as significant as the Patriot Act or The Homeland Security 
Act, however it illustrates the number of laws that were proposed and passed by 
Congress. This illustrates the focus on national security, and the ability the United States 
government had to pass strict immigration policies that would eliminate the issues of 
illegal immigration once and for all. Section V of the IRTPA was titled “Border 
Protection, Immigration, and Visa Matters.” Section 5102, part A states:  
 
 “The Secretary of Homeland Security shall design the pilot program 
under this subtitle to have the following features:  
 
 1) Use of advanced technological systems, including sensors, video, and 
unmanned aerial vehicles, for border surveillance,  
2) Use of advanced computing and decision integration software,  
3) Testing of advanced technology systems and software to best and most 
cost-effective uses of advanced technology to improve border security,  
4) Operation of the program in remote stretches of border lands with long 
distances between 24-hour ports of entry with a relatively small presence 
of United States border patrol officers,  
5) Capability to expand the program upon a determination by the 
Secretary that expansion would be an appropriate and cost-effective means 
of improving border security.”158 
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  The IRTPA gave Homeland Security more tools and resources to be able to 
patrol the border. It allowed for the use of technology that would improve the ability to 
prevent illegal immigrants from entering into the United States. There was little 
controversy regarding this policy, illustrating that there was unanimous support for this 
legislation and other legislation to prevent illegal immigration. The issue became the 
implementation of all of these new policies, because as shown, the number of illegal 
immigrants continued to rise from 2000 to 2005, even with these laws passed.  
 
The U.S. Relationship with Mexico following 9/11 
Following the terrorist attacks on 9/11, illegal immigration was viewed through a 
different lens. Instead of being illegal immigrants trying to enter the country to seek a 
better life, it became possible terrorists trying to enter the country to commit national 
terror. It is obvious that the relationship with Mexico was going to change following 
9/11. The developing relationship between Vicente Fox and George W. Bush drastically 
changed because of the vulnerability felt by the United States at its borders. Although 
none of the 9/11 terrorists entered the country through Mexico, what stopped the next 
terrorist from doing so? This mindset created a major change, where “immigration, as 
with all policy issues, is now viewed through a security lens. Security is the utmost 
priority and security-related issues have replaced all others at the top of Washington’s 
agenda. Any immigration proposals that resurface on the political agenda, such as 
regularization of status or issuance of student visas, will be geared toward this overriding 
policy concern. Given the personal and political capital that Presidents Bush and Fox 
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have invested in the relationship between the two countries even prior to September 11, it 
is important to note that the United States has created an additional  
standard for friendship: the degree to which another state cooperates—in fact, partners—
in the war against terrorism.”159 
 The discussion before the terrorist attacks on 9/11 were focused on the 
legalization process of Mexican immigrants, and figuring out the best way to safeguard 
those immigrants entering into the United States, while even questioning if it is best to 
open the borders completely. On the morning of September 11th, Bush was envisioning a 
bright future with Mexico. Fox had just left from a progressive meeting where they 
strengthened their relationship, as it promised electoral dividends for Bush. Immediately 
following the terror attacks, Fox was almost forgotten about, as national security from 
terrorism became the main priority. In two national polls after September 11th, roughly 80 
percent of Americans concluded that it was “too easy” for foreigners to enter the country. 
“In Congress talk of amnesty for illegal aliens yielded a scramble to plug porous borders 
and keep track of the movements of foreigners. The meetings of U.S.-Mexico High Level 
Working Group on Migration, headed on the U.S. side by Secretary of State Colin Powell 
and Attorney General John Ashcroft, were suspended. When they resumed in January, 
the urgency was gone; the pace and the dynamics had changed.”160 
 There were some attempts for progress with the U.S.-Mexico relationship. In 
March of 2002, the two countries singed a “Smart Border” declaration stating that  																																																								
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 …the international campaign to eradicate terrorism requires us to address 
pressing new priorities and shared goals central to defending our societies 
and ways of life. At the same time, we recognized that the events of 
September 11 underscore more than ever the importance of the U.S.-
Mexican relationship, as partners and neighbors, in the attainment of those 
goals and in realizing the vision we have set forth for our countries’ 
future...We will build a border that protects our societies against those 
who would do us harm, and that truly serves the human and economic 
needs of our dynamic relationship.161 
The two nations also launched “Partnership for Prosperity,” which was aimed to 
“leverage private resources to create jobs and promote prosperity in less developed areas 
of Mexico.” This pact would create capital for small companies, and create scholarship 
programs for Mexicans to attend college in the U.S. 
 With regards to bilateral migration negotiations, there had been a lot of 
discussions regarding making the legalization process more efficient and effective. These 
discussions included an earned legalization program for illegal immigrants and a new 
temporary worker program that would bring workers from Mexico to fill employment 
gaps. There was a growing frustration following 9/11, as the legalization process for 
Mexican immigration was not a top priority for the United States. This frustration was 
especially present after the United States refused to appoint a chief negotiator. Mexican 
Foreign Minister Jorge Castaneda resigned in January of 2003 because of the lack of 
negotiations and progress by the U.S. Although immigration was a priority for the United 
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States, it was more oriented towards national security and terrorism, not a comprehensive 
immigration reform to legalize Mexican immigrants.  
 Although these attempts seem earnest, it is clear there is a declining relationship 
between the countries. The Mexican government has taken steps that have angered the 
U.S. In August of 2002, President Fox declined an invitation by Bush to a summit 
because he was protesting the execution of a convicted murderer who was a Mexican 
national. Also, on January 21, 2003, Mexico asked the International Court of Justices to 
prevent the executions of 51 Mexicans on death row in the U.S.162 They claimed that 
there was a violation of international law when the U.S. failed to inform consular officials 
when Mexican migrants were arrested or sentenced. Mexico also filed a separate suit 
against the U.S. with the InterAmerican Human Rights Court of the OAS, saying that the 
U.S. treatment of migrant workers is in violation of international law.163 The combination 
of these law suits, along with anti-immigrant groups illustrating how illegal immigration 
is a national security threat left President Bush and the American public leery of a deal 
with Mexico. 
 There was also a strain with Bush and Fox over the different opinions on Iraq. 
Fox also had anti-war beliefs, as he was the first country to formally withdraw from the 
Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance, or the Rio Treaty, to protest the U.S. 
intention to invade Iraq. Mexico is a nonpermanent member of the U.S. Security Council, 
and held an important vote on Iraqi policy. In the fall of 2002, Mexico lobbied with 
France to have the U.N. conduct weapons inspections in Iraq before war. 
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 As illustrated, the attacks on 9/11 strained the relationship between the United 
States and Mexico, even though Mexico did not play a role in the attacks. The attacks 
shifted the focus of U.S. policies, changed the rhetoric from helping Mexican immigrants 
enter the country legally to preventing terrorists/illegal immigrants, following 9/11 they 
seem to be categorized the same, from entering the United States. 
 
Border Patrol and the Secure Border Initiative 
It would be expected that there would be a drastic increase in the number of border patrol 
agents following 9/11. However, the mission and goals changed, not the number of 
agents. The rate of growth for border agents was actually higher in the years prior to 9/11 
than the years following. One reason behind this was that there was a focus on other 
aspects of border patrol, like the equipment used for surveillance. In the four years 
proceeding 9/11, full-time Border Patrol agents increased from 6,817 in 1997 to 9,651 in 
2001, which is a 42 percent increase.164 By comparison, in the four years following the 
attacks, they increased from 9,902 in 2002 to 11,106 in 2005, an increase of only 15 
percent.165 Although there may have been a focus on making the border more effectively 
patrolled, the budget drastically increased the years following 9/11 to strengthen security. 
The percent of border agents along the Mexican border compared to the Canadian border 
is stark. In 2001, for example, 93.9 percent of the agents were located along the border 
with Mexico. In 2005, 88.8 percent were assigned to this border. In 2001, 3.4 percent of 
the agents were along the border with Canada, which rose to 8.8 percent in 2005.166  
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 As previously stated, the number of illegal immigrants continued to increase 
following 9/11. This cat and mouse like game of illegal immigrants and border patrol did 
not change after the terror attacks. The number of apprehensions by border patrol 
decreased during the years following 9/11.167 This means that illegal immigrants were 
entering through less traveled, more dangerous areas. The most significant change for the 
border patrol was the inclusion of ensuring future terrorists did not enter the country. 
Although there was a major focus on drug control and making sure illegal immigrants did 
not enter the country, there was an increased suspicion because of this. 
 In the immediate years following 9/11, the policies were aimed at strengthening 
the border through national security measures. However, it was not until 2005 when the 
DHS launched the Secure Border Initiative (SBI), which was described by DHS 
Secretary Michael Chertoff as “a comprehensive multiyear plan to secure America’s 
borders and reduce illegal migration.” Although legislation was passed creating the DHS, 
along with increasing funding to border control, this initiative was the first attempt to 
actually increase border security. SBI’s goal was to organize the four components of 
border security, including Customs and Border Protection, Immigration and Customs 
Enforcement, U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services, and the U.S. Coast Guard. 
 The three goals of SBI was to improve border security, increase interior 
enforcement of immigration and custom laws, and implement a temporary worker 
program. However, there were many issues with the implementation of this multiyear, 
multibillion-dollar program aimed at securing the borders and reducing illegal 
immigration. The United States Government Accountability Office (GAO) in a report to 																																																								
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the Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs found that SBInet, 
which refers to “surveillance technologies, such as sensors, cameras, and radars, as well 
as command, control, communications, and intelligence (C3I) technologies, including 
software and hardware to produce a Common Operating Picture (COP),” that “since the 
inception of SBInet, GAO has reported on a range of issues regarding design and 
implementation, including program challenges, management weaknesses, and cost, 
schedule, and performance risks… for example, in October 2007, we testified that DHS 
had made some progress in implementing Project 28—the first segment of SBInet 
technology across the southwest border—but had fallen behind its planned schedule.”168 
 The SBI was aimed at deploying over 300 miles of single-layer fencing. But as 
of April 2010, “SBInet’s promised technology capabilities are still not operational and 
delays continue to require Border Patrol to rely on existing technology for securing the 
border, rather than using the newer SBInet technology planned to overcome the existing 
technology’s limitations. When CBP initiated SBInet in 2006, it planned to complete 
SBInet deployment along the entire southwest border in fiscal year 2009, but by February 
2009, the completion date had slipped to 2016.”169 Although the initiatives of SBInet 
seemed true, the implementation of these policies was not effective. As of 2010, the 
technology used by border patrol had issues, like cameras losing signal. This may be one 
reason why the number of apprehensions decreased, because when illegal immigrants 
decided to enter through Arizona where there had initially been less protection, the 
equipment used failed. 																																																								
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Secure Fence Act of 2006  
It was not until 2006 that President Bush decided it was time to strengthen the border 
with an actual border. It took five years after 9/11 for the administration to realize that 
illegal immigrants continued to enter the country at high rates, and that something needed 
to be done. The Secure Fence Act of 2006, H.R. 6061, partially funded the construction 
of 700 miles of fencing. This act was in conjunction with the SBInet, as it seemed that 
SBInet was more focused on the technology of the border, not the border itself. Bush 
signed the act into law on October 26, 2006, and stated that the act would “help protect 
the American people” and would “make our border more secure.”170 
 Although the Secure Fence Act was passed in 2006, it was not until 2009 that the 
DHS erected over 600 miles of fencing. Although the initial act required the DHS to 
construct two-layered fencing, the Act allowed the discretion of the DHS in where the 
fence needs to be two-layer. Although 600 miles may seem like a significant part of the 
border, it is approximately only a quarter of the length of the U.S-Mexican border.  
 Similarly to Operation Gatekeeper, this act seemed to only push immigrants to 
other entry points. The freedom that the Secure Fence Act gave the DHS led to a single 
fence being constructed, which did little from preventing illegal immigrants from 
entering. This wall that was erected in 2009 from the Secure Fence Act did not stop 
illegal immigrants from entering, illustrating the poor effort of construction. The 
difference between the fence that was constructed during Operation Gatekeeper and the 
fence from the Secure Fence Act was the height and width of the wall. Operation 
Gatekeeper was only the first 14 miles, however, the fence was over ten feet tall and had 
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multiple layers. On the contrary, the fence that was built from the Secure Fence Act was 
not always as secure. 
 From 2005 all the way to 2010, CBP increased the total miles of the southwest 
border from 119 miles to 654 miles. However, the Secure Fence Act only included 37 
miles of secondary fencing. Also, only 354 miles is pedestrian fencing, like the normal 
wall one would expect. The other 300 miles is vehicle fencing, which is a type of fencing 
that involves large cement blocks and other means that would only stop a vehicle from 
entering. However, this type of border freely allows illegal immigrants to walk right into 
the country. The majority of the vehicle fencing is where illegal immigrants may be 
entering from, which is along the Arizona-Mexico border. There was success to these 
vehicle fences, as Border Patrol in the El Paso and Tucson sectors reported that “they 
experienced significant decreases in drive throughs following the deployment of vehicle 
fencing. Officials in the Tucson sector reported that vehicle fencing deployed improved 
Border Patrol agents’ ability to impede and deny the entry of large amounts of illegal 
narcotics transported by motorized vehicles.”171 
 There was a significant monetary cost to build 600 new miles of fence, even if 
half could not prevent individuals from walking across it. CBP reported that it cost a little 
more than $2 billion and also estimated it would cost another $1 billion to sustain this 
fence over the next 20 years. 
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Guidance for Identifying Capability Gaps. Report to Congressional Requesters. February 2017. 
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Conclusion 
Following the terrorist attacks on 9/11, sweeping initiatives were passed. The focus was 
on securing the borders to prevent future terrorists from entering the country. However, it 
is evident by the increasing number of illegal immigrants from 2000 to 2010 that the 
failure to implement the policies is to blame. Although it could be argued that even 
though there was an increase of illegal immigration, it was only a stepping-stone for 
future success. This argument proves that the initiatives failed at preventing illegal 
immigrants from entering the country during the immediate years after the terrorist 
attacks.  
 The Anti-Terrorism Act of 2001, The United and Strengthening America by 
Providing Appropriate Tolls Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorist Act of 2001, 
known as the Patriot Act, the Enhanced Border Security and Visa Entry Reform Act 
(EBSVERA), the Homeland Security Act of 2002, and the Intelligence Reform and 
Terrorism Prevention Act (IRTPA) all brought momentous changes. Although there were 
implementation failures with each initiative, it was the beginning of securing the borders. 
However, if these initiatives were unable to prevent illegal immigrants from entering the 
country, how could it be certain terrorists could not just as easily enter?  
 The goal of this chapter was to illustrate the number of laws and initiatives that 
were passed aimed at securing the border, yet with little to show for it. Instead of border 
security being about preventing non-citizens from entering, it became about preventing 
terrorists from entering. Illegal immigration is a national security policy because it is 
unknown who enters through the border when left unsecured. Although there was this 
change of mission, and change of governmental structure, little success came from it. The 
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concluding chapter will look at policies from pre- and post-9/11, and argue that 
presidents Clinton and Bush failed to take advantage of their presidencies to effectively 
secure the borders. 
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CHAPTER 5 
 
“This is a day when all Americans from every walk of life unite in our resolve for justice 
and peace. America has stood down enemies before, and we will do so this time. None of 
us will ever forget this day, yet we go forward to defend freedom and all that is good and 
just in our world.” 
- President George W. Bush, 9/11 Address to the Nation, delivered on  
  11 September from the Oval Office, Washington D.C. 
 
 All Americans were shaken to their core with fear, confusion, and even anger 
when nearly 3,000 innocent men and women were killed in four coordinated terrorist 
attacks on the Pentagon, the crash of United Flight 93, and the collapse of the World 
Trade Center North and South towers in New York City on September 11, 2001. 
 Americans everywhere doubted their own safety and the safety of their family, 
friends, and the nation. They immediately demanded leadership by the federal 
government to prevent future homeland terrorist attacks. In reaction, the goals and 
missions of the three branches of the United States government changed dramatically 
following the attacks. But while there was an immediate and concentrated focus to 
improve future national security, it spawned many questions as to how past immigration 
laws should have prevented the devastation of September 11th. How could the United 
States have been so vulnerable to attacks by 19 hijackers affiliated with the Islamic 
terrorist group al-Qaeda? What role did President Clinton's immigration policies from his 
eight years in office factor into this attack on American soil? 
 In the aftermath of 9/11 and with the urging of President Bush, Congress quickly 
passed numerous measures to improve national security that seemed a step in the right 
direction but were significantly flawed in policy and in their ability to be implemented. 
The question soon became: Was the United States really more secure from attacks than in 
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the years before September 11? While Bush pushed ahead to protect the United States 
from foreign enemies abroad, Americans also became increasingly alarmed with the 
possibility of terrorists crossing the southern border through Mexico. 
 Illegal immigration now became a top-priority, national security issue. Borders 
were “tightened,” yet illegal immigration continued to rise. Deportation laws were made 
more “efficient,, yet there was only a slight increase in deportations in the five years 
following September 11th. More “effective” government organizations were formed, yet 
immigration reform was not effectively executed. Presidents Clinton and Bush both had 
chances during their terms to significantly lower illegal immigration. Clinton was elected 
and reelected during the 1990s when he supported the national sentiment to secure the 
southern border with Mexico, but yet his policies largely failed to limit the rising 
numbers crossing illegally. Bush had been in office less than eight months when the most 
deadly attack on American soil since Pearl Harbor took place, but it can be argued that 
Bush did not fully deliver on his promises to keep America safe since the flow of illegal 
immigrants significantly increased crime during his terms.  
 This chapter first explores the national costs associated with illegal immigration, 
and how Clinton and Bush essentially burdened the nation by not recognizing that illegal 
immigration had become both a major social and national security problem. The chapter 
will then look at several policies from both administrations and congressional measures 
to evaluate how they benefited the resolve to eliminate or at least decrease illegal 
immigration. Next is an analysis of which policies were successful and how other 
immigration issues were not fully addressed or became missed opportunities. Finally, the 
question of whether Clinton and/or Bush promoted effective illegal immigration laws, 
93 
policies, and executive orders to fully secure the southern border is considered, and if 
they fulfilled their campaign promises to keep Americans safe. While both presidents 
clearly had opportunities to reform immigration, the greater question that all Americans 
can ask today is whether Clinton and Bush demonstrated effective presidential leadership 
in their efforts to permanently solve illegal immigration issues during their presidencies? 
  
The Damage of Illegal Immigration: Why it should matter? 
The question still remains: Why should Clinton and Bush have cared about illegal 
immigration? There are many different answers to this question, but the most reasonable 
one was and is the financial burden to Americans for the increasing numbers of illegal 
immigrants migrating into the United States each year. The Congressional Budget Office 
(CBO) did a study in 2007 that presented facts and research on the burden of illegal 
immigration.172 In this study, the CBO looked at different types of illegal immigrant 
costs, ranging from education, health care, and law enforcement. An important note on 
this study was that the CBO admitted that there was not an effective way of measuring 
the national costs of illegal immigrants, instead only state and local costs.  
 Illegal immigrants burden education costs because of the fact that their children 
are typically non-English speaking and require additional services that over-task local, 
state, and federal budgets. In 1982 the Supreme Court ruled that schools cannot turn away 
children because of their immigration status.173 In 2007, there was an estimated two 
million school children who are illegal immigrants, and another three million children 																																																								
172 Congressional Budget Office. The Impact of Unauthorized Immigrants on the Budgets of 
State and Local Governments, (2007). https://www.cbo.gov/sites/default/files/110th-congress-
2007-2008/reports/12-6-immigration.pdf. 
173Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202 (1982). 
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that are born to illegal immigrants after they arrived in the U.S.174 On the local level, the 
Pew Hispanic Center conducted a study for 2003-2004 and found that New Mexico state 
spent $67 million for 9,200 illegal immigrant schoolchildren. Health Care is another 
significant cost because of illegal immigration. The federal government requires health 
facilities that receive federal assistance to provide service, regardless of their immigration 
status or their ability to pay for the help. In 2000, county governments that share a border 
with Mexico spent $190 million in costs providing health care to illegal immigrants.175 
Another significant cost by illegal immigrants is through law enforcement. Illegal 
immigrants who commit crimes are not immediately deported; they are instead processed 
through the local criminal justice system. In 2001, law enforcement activities involving 
illegal immigrants in counties that shared a border with Mexico, specifically in 
California, Arizona, New Mexico, and Texas, had a combined total of more than $108 
million additional costs than in 1999.176 In San Diego County alone, $50 million was 
spent in 1999, which was nine percent of their total spending for law enforcement in that 
year.177 
 Illegal immigration has always been an unwarranted cost to state and federal 
budgets and the American taxpayer. There are mized opinions, but research has shown 
																																																								
174 Urban Institute, Children of Immigrants: Facts and Figures (Washington, D.C.: Urban 
Institute, 2006); and Passel, Unauthorized Migrants. 
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that the economic benefit of illegal immigration has not outweighed the burden of their 
social services needs.178 For decades, most Americans have been challenged to accept 
illegal immigration as a way of life in the United States. Clinton campaigned on reducing 
illegal immigration in 1996, while immigration issues became a major national security 
priority for Bush following 9/11. However, what followed from both presidents seemed 
to be policies that did not effectively stop illegal migration into the United States. The 
result of many of Clinton and Bush's policies were more political rhetoric than substance 
because they did not permanently end illegal immigration. 
 
Operation Gatekeeper: What went wrong? 
Clinton was riding an immigration reform wave when he supported a measure by 
the U.S. Border Patrol to strengthen the U.S./Mexico border in the months before 
California voters approved Proposition 187, which was a referendum aimed at illegal 
immigration, in the November 1994 elections. Although a federal district court later ruled 
the California proposition unconstitutional, it illustrated the frustration of voters. One of 
the most crucial influences of Operation Gatekeeper was the political environment before 
and after it was introduced. The 1996 reelection campaign was focused on immigration, 
especially following Prop 187 just a few years prior. Clinton needed to win California in 
order to win the election, so introducing Operation Gatekeeper and the IIRIRA ensured 
just that. The only election defeat by Clinton was his reelection campaign in the Arkansas 
gubernational election of 1980, which came after he agreed to house Cuban refugees in 																																																								
178 Richwine, Jason, and Robert Rector. “The Fiscal Cost of Unlawful Immigrants and Amnesty 
to the U.S. Taxpayer.” The Heritage Foundation, May 6, 2013. 
https://www.heritage.org/immigration/report/the-fiscal-cost-unlawful-immigrants-and-amnesty-
the-us-taxpayer. 
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Arkansas after the Mariel boatlift.179 Thus, Clinton knew he need to have a strong 
presence on illegal immigration.  
Operation Gatekeeper secured Congressional funding for the first 14 miles of wall 
construction from the Pacific Ocean and doubling the number of border patrol agents. But 
all this did was shift illegal immigrant crossing routes east into more dangerous terrain. 
While Operation Gatekeeper was not considered a lasting success, it did prove that a 
durable wall along with tougher border security policies prevented illegal immigrants 
from easily crossing into the United States. 
 After building the wall, San Diego saw a decrease from 40 percent of illegal 
immigration crossings drop to ten percent by 2000. The first 14 miles of wall 
construction was such a success for Operation Gatekeeper proponents that even 
California U.S. Senator Dianne Feinstein remarked in 1999 how “Operation Gatekeeper 
has really been an unprecedented success. What it tells me is it’s a myth that the border 
can’t be enforced. It can be enforced.”180 Robert Back, the top policy official for the INS 
in 1999 said, “It is wonderful progress in an area where, frankly, most of us never really 
believed that government intervention like this would work.”181  
 However, Operation Gatekeeper should not be viewed as a success but instead a 
missed opportunity because President Clinton and Congress were shortsighted by not 
constructing a durable wall the entire 1,954-mile length of the southern border with 
Mexico. At that time, it was mutually agreed by both Democrats and Republicans that the 
United States should strengthen their border policies. But only 14 miles of wall 																																																								
179 Freidel, Frank, and Hugh Sidey. “William J. Clinton.” The White House. White House 
Historical Association, 2006. https://www.whitehouse.gov/about-the-white-
house/presidents/william-j-clinton/. 
180 U.S. Senator Dianne Feinstein, Address to Congress, 1999. 
181 Robert Back, Interview, New York Times, 1999. 
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construction was hardly a reasonable solution to stop illegal crossings. As the problem 
was pushed into Arizona, New Mexico, and Texas, the number of illegal immigrants 
continued to rise as did crime and drug trafficking along the border. Even the U.S. 
General Accounting Office concluded that ''although illegal alien apprehension has 
shifted, there is no clear indication that overall illegal entry into the United States along 
the Southwest border has declined."182  
One of the most crucial parts of Operation Gatekeeper was the political 
environment before and after it was introduced. The 1996 reelection campaign was 
focused on immigration, especially following Prop 187 just a few years prior. Clinton 
needed to win California in order to win the election, so introducing Operation 
Gatekeeper and the IIRIRA ensured just that. The only election defeat by Clinton was his 
reelection campaign in the Arkansas gubernational election of 1980, which came after he 
agreed to house Cuban refugees in Arkansas after the Mariel boatlift.183 Thus Clinton 
knew better this time, and wanted to have a strong presence on illegal immigration.  
 Although it was politically advantageous and cheaper to simply build a wall for 
the first 14 miles, Clinton actually perpetrated a lasting disservice to Americans by not 
supporting wall construction the entire length of the southern border.  
 
Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1999 
Operation Gatekeeper was not the only illegal immigration policy that should be cited as 
a missed opportunity. The Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act 
of 1996 ought to be viewed as an even bigger bust than Operation Gatekeeper. Even 																																																								
182 United States. General Accounting Office. INS’s Southwest Border Strategy: Resource and 
Impact Issues Remain After Seven Years. Washington D.C., 2001. 
183 "1982 Arkansas Elections". Arkansas Secretary of State. May 1983. Retrieved May 01, 2019. 
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though there were important parts of the IIRIRA that can be viewed as a stepping-stone 
to further reform, as a whole, its goal and mission to prevent illegal immigration were not 
achieved. Although the IIRIRA increased funding to the border, it was only for the 14-
mile wall that was built from Operation Gatekeeper.184 It is somewhat surprising that 
President Clinton and Congress did not expand wall construction after realizing how 
successfully Operation Gatekeeper shifted the paths of illegal immigrants. While 
increased wall construction would have been effective, the IIRIRA failed because 
implementation of the bill was slow due to a slow legal system that detained illegal 
immigrants for lengthy periods before they had a detention hearing.  
Similarly to Operation Gatekeeper, there were alternate motives behind Clintons 
support of the IIRIRA. The intention of the Clinton Administration in signing it was due 
to the political environment of the time. Clinton’s intention to ensure he received the 
votes from Californians encouraged his support of the legislation. As senior advisor to 
President Clinton, Rahm Emanuel, put it, “The illegal immigration legislation provides 
that same opportunity; now that the legislation is passed, we can build up a strong 
Administration record on immigration.”185 
Immigrants cross over the southern border of the United States illegally for work 
opportunities or to flee dangerous conditions in their home country. One of the ways that 
the United States has tried to discourage illegal immigrants from entering to work is to 
fine employers who hire them. In 1986, Congress introduced employer sanctions that 
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fined employers if they hired illegal immigrants.186 The idea behind a steep fine was that 
if there were no jobs in the United States for illegal immigrants, they would be 
discouraged from migrating. However, in 2002, the INS only issued 53 notices of intent 
to fine employers.187 In years prior to 1996, the INS routinely issued more than 1,000 
Notices of Intent to Fine to employers per year.188 The IIRIRA did not address this 
concern. It did increase the involvement of illegal immigrants with the criminal justice 
system, which proved to be both beneficial yet detrimental. Another issue that has been 
brought into question by politicians and legal scholars: Should illegal immigrants be 
treated in the legal system equal to American citizens? The IIRIRA allocated $670 
million to create detention centers where illegal immigrants would be housed before their 
hearing.189 This slow judicial deportation process has cost United States taxpayers 
hundreds of millions of dollars during the past twenty years. 
Another failed implementation of the IIRIRA were the mandatory detention rules. 
Misinterpretation of the policies led to failed implementation. The detention rules stated 
that INS was to take aliens who are deportable on specified criminal grounds into custody 
"when the alien is released,” and it limits the circumstances in which the INS could 
release the illegal immigrant.190 The INS interpreted this rule by taking all illegal 
immigrants into custody for crimes they committed in the past, even if they had served 
their sentences and were released, and rejected requests for discretionary release, saying 
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that the IIRIRA took away their power to do so. The next problem was the failure of the 
IIRIRA to develop a sound deportation immigration policy: Why should an immigrant 
who is in the United States illegally be released back into the United States? Policies like 
this allowed the number of aliens to skyrocket during the Clinton and Bush presidencies. 
If the IIRIRA had allowed for an illegal immigrant to be detained and deported through a 
swift hearing process, then it would have been more effective in stopping illegal 
immigration. However, one important benefit of the IIRIRA was the increase in border 
security funding and the increase of border patrol agents. 
 
Immigration Policies 2000-Pre 9/11 2001 
When Texas governor and Republican Party candidate George W. Bush was elected 
president in late 2000, it was expected that the relationship between the United States and 
Mexico would improve. Bush had realized in the months leading up to the November 
election that he would have to garner a larger share of the Latino vote than most 
Republican candidates to win the presidency, which proved to be true with his slim 
victory in Florida to beat Vice President Al Gore. Rather than supporting further wall 
construction in the 2000 presidential campaign to combat the continued rise in illegal 
immigration during Clinton's presidency, candidate Bush backed off any support for wall 
construction as to ensure that it did not become a campaign issue. It worked and Bush 
was narrowly elected president by the Electoral College despite losing the popular vote.  
 President Bush supported immigration policies in the seven months prior to 9/11 
that were aimed at making the legalization process more efficient. What President Bush 
failed to understand was that the real danger in not securing the border was that it 
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immediately led to increased crime and drug trafficking. Even though every year during 
Clinton’s presidency had seen a drastic increase in the number of illegal crossings into 
the United States, it took the terrorist attacks of 9/11 for Bush to reverse much of his 
campaign rhetoric to champion a strong national security position that did change 
immigration policies at all United States borders. 
In the early months of his presidency prior to 9/11, Bush had been focused on 
improving relationships between Mexico and the United States through meetings with 
Mexican President Fox rather than forcing a hardliner approach on illegal immigration. In 
fact, it was during this time that Bush supported the first unsuccessful attempt to create 
the DREAM Act for children who had illegally entered the United States with their 
parents. 
Without the events of 9/11, it is difficult to speculate how Bush would have 
resolved the increasing numbers of illegal immigrants migrating into the United States. 
So how did 9/11 change Bush’s rhetoric? It transformed Bush's previous declaration, 
“For those who want to wall off Mexico from Texas, I say you’re dead wrong” to “I was 
the governor of a state that has a twelve-hundred mile border with Mexico. So I know 
how difficult it is to enforce the border, and how important it is.”191 In the years 
following 9/11, Bush had several missed opportunities to propose legislation to extend 
wall construction and deportation reform that would have drastically decreased illegal 
immigration. 
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Anti-Terrorism Act of 2001 and the Patriot Act 
In the month following the September 11 attacks, the Anti-Terrorism Act of 2001 was 
submitted to Congress and was soon followed by the PATRIOT Act. The terrorism of 
9/11 certainly brought the issue of illegal crossings into the United States to the forefront 
of Bush's new policies. Illegal immigration now became his number one domestic 
priority. The PATRIOT Act was one of the most highly-criticized and debated laws that 
Bush introduced. There were many questions about constitutional infringements, 
particularly sections of the Patriot Act that related to illegal immigration from Mexico. 
One of the most controversial parts, Section 412, directly impacted illegal immigrants 
because the section allowed for indefinite detention even if they were not terrorists.192 
However, the section also allowed for the release of illegal immigrants into the United 
States if their home country did not accept them. This set a precedent that reduced 
penalties if illegal immigrants could not be immediately deported. However, the 
PATRIOT Act said that when an immigrant was not certified, meaning they did not pose 
a national security risk, they were released into the United States population. This was a 
perfect example of a failed immigration policy. 
The release of illegal immigrants into the United States is one of the reasons why 
there was an increase in illegal immigration from 2000 to 2005. The PATRIOT Act 
became a constitutional conflict that could not force immediate deportation due to habeas 
corpus and judicial review issues. But the fact remained that illegal immigration cost 
Americans hundreds of millions of dollars with a policy that originated with the Bush 
administration. It compromised the federal budget because illegal immigrants were given 
equal treatment to legal Americans and residents. The Government Accountability Office 																																																								
192 The Patriot Act, supra note 139. 
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released a report that examined the criminal histories of 55,322 aliens that “entered the 
country illegally and were still illegally in the country at the time of their incarceration in 
federal or state prison or local jail during fiscal year 2003.”193 In this report, those 55,322 
illegal immigrants had been arrested 459,614 times, which is an average of 8.3 arrests per 
person, and had committed close to 700,000 criminal offenses, which is an average of 
12.7 offenses per person.194 Bush should have developed a policy that was constitutional 
to permit the immediate deportation of illegal immigrants once they were taken into 
custody. 
 Similar to Clinton, Bush felt pressure by his party to be viewed as a strong 
national security president. Illegal immigration is a national security issue because it can 
not be known if a possible terrorist enters through the border if left unsecured. 
Immediately following 9/11, Bush was expected to support all legislation that was tough 
on national security, which would include securing the nation’s borders. At the time, 
there was support by both parties to do so. This window of opportunity is why the 
legislation that was passed can be viewed as a failure, because this was the opportunity to 
finally secure the southern border with Mexico.  
 
The Homeland Security Act of 2002 
The Homeland Security Act was the largest and most complex reorganization of the 
federal government since the Department of Defense was created after World War II. It 
combined 22 different agencies with 170,000 federal employees to create a new federal 
bureaucracy. The Homeland Security Act directly affected illegal immigration reform 																																																								
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because it eliminated the Immigration Naturalization Service and the U.S. Customs 
Service was reorganized to become the Bureau of Customs and Border Protection (CBP). 
Despite this departmental reform, the number of illegal immigrant crossings continued to 
increase during the Bush years. 
 Was the consolidation of the U.S. Customs Service into the Department of 
Homeland Security the best solution to reform illegal immigration at the southern border? 
The Department of Homeland Security became the third largest federal department, 
growing the number of federal employees from 170,000 to 240,000.195 The lack of a clear 
mission complicated the role of the DHS in the illegal immigration issue. The 
counterterrorism mission following 9/11 caused more confusion for the border patrol 
agency. Prior to the terrorist attacks, the Customs Service was focused on drug busts and 
preventing illegal immigrants from entering. Afterwards, the mission changed to 
counterterrorism. This priority change made the CBP less efficient in preventing illegal 
immigration because they were now tasked with searching for possible terrorists.  
The DHS budget grew from $27 billion in 2003 to $57 billion by 2007.196 An 
example of one of the failed DHS projects was the Secure Border Initiative Network 
virtual fence project for a 53-mile portion of the Arizona-Mexico border. The CBP spent 
$1 billion on this project before it was abandoned in 2011.197 If the CBP had been 
organized into its own independent department along with ICE, similar to how the INS 
regulated immigration for 125 years, it would have developed better immigration policies 																																																								
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at the border. The complexities of illegal immigration during the Bush administration 
were worthy of an independent agency to be more effective to implement presidential 
policies and congressional measures. It also compromised CBP when it had to compete 
for funding against FEMA, TSA, ICE, and the Secret Service. 
 
Secure Fence Act of 2006 
The Secure Fence Act of 2006 was the first time President Bush supported the 
construction of a physical wall along the southern border. From 2005 until 2010, CBP 
increased the wall from 119 miles to 654 miles.198 This is misleading because 300 miles 
was vehicle fencing, meaning an individual can easily walk through it. However, the 
success from this increase proved that a completed wall from the Pacific Ocean to the 
Gulf of Mexico would significantly reduce the number of illegal immigrant crossings. 
Illegal immigrants are only able to enter the United States through sections that do not 
have a wall with surveillance. 
 The major failure in the Secure Fence Act of 2006 is the same failure that was 
prevalent with Operation Gatekeeper: it did not complete the task of building a wall along 
the entire southern border. While a finished wall itself would not have been the total 
answer without major increases in border agents and technology, it would have been 
effective in decreasing the number of illegal immigrants. If it worked in San Diego 
during Operation Gatekeeper, what would have prevented it from working along the 
Arizona-Mexico border? The most reasonable answer is the terrain, but different types of 
barriers would have prevented entry. The best way to lower the number of illegal 
immigrants in the United States is to prevent them from entering the country in the first 																																																								
198 "Fact Sheet: The Secure Fence Act of 2006". The White House. 
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place. Therefore, securing the entire southern border should have been Bush's top 
priority, followed by a more effective deportation process that was constitutional.  
 
Illegal Immigration – Final Thoughts 
Both Clinton and Bush failed during their presidencies to promote effective policies and 
laws that would have had long-term benefits to stop the increase of illegal immigrant 
crossings into the United States. Both presidents failed to take advantage of several 
political, economic, and social opportunities to extend the wall east to the Gulf of Mexico 
and support the adoption of effective laws by Congress that would have prudently solved 
many immigration problems. Both presidents simply did not want to risk their 
presidencies by recognizing illegal immigration for the serious problem that it has 
become in the 21st century. Therefore, it can certainly be argued that these presidents 
abdicated presidential leadership by not resolving the core issues of illegal immigration 
during their terms. 
 Given the historical background and analysis of the immigration issue presented 
to the reader in this thesis, it is appropriate for this writer to present my perspectives to 
the questions offered in the introduction: Why didn't the United States Congress and 
President Clinton pass laws and implement strong policies and/or Executive Orders that 
could have helped to prevent today's political division in American society? And, how 
did President Bush fail to take advantage of the 9/11 window of opportunity to fully 
strengthen United States immigration laws that would have permanently strengthened 
America's southern borders with Mexico? 
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 To answer the first question, which essentially asks: Why didn’t President Clinton 
pass stronger illegal immigration policies, one needs to understand the political realities 
of Clinton's eight years in office. To be fair, Operation Gatekeeper was the first 
immigration law of its kind. It was the first time illegal immigrant routes were disrupted, 
and the first time a policy aimed at strengthening border security was implemented since 
President Ronald Reagan's immigration reforms of 1986. However, it was naïve for 
Clinton, Congress, and even the border states who played a role in its design to believe 
illegal immigrants would simply give up because the terrain was tougher to enter the 
United States. These illegal immigrants were knowingly risking their lives to cross 
anywhere along the border, and many had previously been caught and deported several 
times. Operation Gatekeeper and its successor, the Illegal Immigration Reform and 
Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996, were flawed from practically day one because 
crossings numbers of illegal immigrants never decreased. Clinton ought to have issued an 
executive order and/or Congress should have enacted laws to expand the 
wall/surveillance technology to the impacted entry points along the southern border. 
 Why did President Bush fail to take advantage of the 9/11 window of 
opportunity? Bush felt the pressure to do something drastic following the attacks on 
American soil, but ended up doing too much that was too controversial and 
even unconstitutional. Creating the Department of Homeland only caused more confusion 
because it was a massive bureaucratic department that was slow to get things done. 
Another factor that slowed Bush's illegal immigration reform was his reelection 
campaign in 2004. Bush had received more Latino votes in the 2000 election than the 
previous Republican nominee. How could he sustain this if he proposed strict border 
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policies that might anger Latino voters? This concern, however real, caused Bush to be 
ineffective on illegal immigration reform during his presidency. 
 It is clear that both presidents faced political pressures during their presidency. 
For Clinton, the reelection campaign of 1996 influenced his stance on illegal 
immigration, and was one of the main reasons why he supported Operation Gatekeeper 
and the IIRIRA. For Bush, the political pressure to propose strong national security 
measures following 9/11 influenced his stance on illegal immigration. Although no 
known domestic terrorists have entered through the southern border, crime from illegal 
immigrants entering the country is a national security matter. The terrorists who 
committed the crimes on 9/11 were the first to find the loopholes in the visa programs in 
the United States, so who is to say that if the southern border is left unsecured, that a 
future terrorist will not enter the country? If securing the border will save Americans’ 
lives, then it is critical the President ensures that the border is fortified. This means that 
Bush was influenced by the domestic terror attacks on 9/11 to support legislation that 
would secure the southern border. The arguments presented illustrates why both 
presidents failed to take advantage of this window of opportunity to do so.  
 So what immigration laws and policies should Congress and Presidents Clinton 
and Bush have passed and implemented that most Americans would have supported to 
provide strong border security along the southern border? 
 First, Clinton ought to have developed administration policies and proposals to 
Congress that were more comprehensive than Operation Gatekeeper and the Illegal 
Immigration and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996. If Clinton had been unable to get 
cooperation from Congress to support tougher immigration measures, then he should 
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have sought support from Americans through the national media and television/radio 
broadcasts. His failure to promote a wall the entire length of the southern border when 
both political parties agreed on most aspects of immigration reform showed a lack of 
presidential leadership. It was probably the best opportunity during the past 25 years that 
Congress could have agreed on immigration reform. 
 Second, Bush should not have overreached by combining 22 agencies in 
establishing the Department of Homeland Security immediately following 9/11. Initially, 
it diverted too many resources away from illegal immigration efforts with its large 
bureaucracy. Its primary focus, of course, was combating homeland terrorism not illegal 
immigration issues from non-terrorists. 
 Third, Bush should have been more determined following 9/11 to construct a wall 
along the entire southern border as part of his comprehensive national security plan. By 
the time Bush supported the Secure Fence Act of 2006, he was another lame-duck 
president who had also missed a golden opportunity to reform illegal immigration. Bush 
could not even get support from his own Republican Party to pass guest worker 
immigration reform that would have eased illegal migration into the United States. 
 Presidents Clinton and Bush did not take advantage of their opportunities to 
permanently solve illegal immigration problems by building a 1,954-mile wall along the 
entire United States-Mexico border. If either president had demonstrated strong 
leadership to follow through with their campaign rhetoric on immigration, it is possible 
that the United States would not be mired in illegal immigration issues today. Instead, 
illegal immigration is among one of the policy issues that is most divisive within 
American politics today.  
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